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I'm not American, so I'm not well informed on this, but is the basis for federal prohibition of narcotics not the Commerce Clause? Doesn't that mean that, cons
by redthrowaway 13y ago
I'm not American, so I'm not well informed on this, but is the basis for federal prohibition of narcotics not the Commerce Clause? Doesn't that mean that, constitutionally (as far as the USSC is concerned), the states have no right to overrule the federal gov't?
What does this mean for other state nullifications of federal law, like attempts to ignore Obamacare or gun control? Can the states use the USG's acquiescence to state nullification of federal powers ensured by the Commerce Clause in this instance to establish precedence for nullifying federal law in other areas?
- ghayes 13y agoIn Gonzales v Raich[1], the Supreme Court affirmed the government's right to control drugs grown domestically within a state and sold to state citizens. The states, however, are not violating Federal law in non-enforcement. The Federal government is free to enforce its laws against violators of federal laws in its courts (District/Circuit). States are basically declaring that its not a priority or objective of its state police officers. It's not nullification, so much as it's "That's your law; you enforce it." [1] http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1454.ZS.html http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1454.ZS.html
- JoshTriplett 13y agoThat precedent seems rather circular; it effectively says "intrastate commerce affects interstate commerce, thus we can regulate intrastate commerce". That seems like a rather blatant license for arbitrary regulation on an ends-justify-the-means basis: we can't do what we want under those restrictions, so we don't have to follow those restrictions.
- ghayes 13y agoIt might be worth reading Wickard v. Filburn (1942)[1] for the original case that intrastate commerce affecting interstate commerce and therefore regulatable by the federal government. In US v. Lopez (1995)[2], the Court does actual say there are limits to what the federal government can lump under "interstate commerce," as they declare that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was beyond the power of Congress. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wickard_v._Filburn https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wickard_v._Filburn [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Lopez https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Lopez
- baddox 13y ago> That seems like a rather blatant license for arbitrary regulation on an ends-justify-the-means basis: we can't do what we want under those restrictions, so we don't have to follow those restrictions. Of course that's what it is. That's what virtually everything the federal government does is.
- JoshTriplett 13y ago> is the basis for federal prohibition of narcotics not the Commerce Clause? Most likely, along with most federal restrictions. However, if you're making a constitutional argument, the Commerce Clause only regulates interstate commerce, not intrastate commerce. The federal government has no constitutional grounds to regulate anything created, sold, and consumed within the bounds of a state. Hence why Prohibition required a constitutional amendment. If you're looking for precedent, there it is.
- eurleif 13y agoIn Wickard v. Filburn (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wickard_v._Filburn http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wickard_v._Filburn), the Supreme Court pretty much ruled that everything is interstate commerce. That case involved a farmer growing wheat for consumption on the farm. The court ruled that because the grain he grew was grain he wouldn't have to buy, he was having an indirect effect on the interstate market for wheat.
- JoshTriplett 13y agoI'm familiar with the precedent, and I'm aware that the federal government has interpreted the commerce clause as carte blanche for arbitrary regulation; I'm arguing that such interpretation seems blatantly wrong to me.
- Daniel_Newby 13y agoNo. In that case the Supreme Court decided that threshing the wheat turned it into a form that might, hypothetically, sufficiently affect an undefined notional "interstate market". This is doubly unconstitutionally vague.