3 ms·
(EDIT: > It is not really security theater if you consider all the other systems If it's ineffective and just serves as bureaucratic window-dressing, then it i
by stcredzero 13y ago
(EDIT: > It is not really security theater if you consider all the other systems
If it's ineffective and just serves as bureaucratic window-dressing, then it is security theater.)
> What I see is a use of RBAC that is not all that stupid, and that I happen to use on my own systems. RBAC is being used not to guard against abuse but to guard against mistakes.
What specific information are you using to come to this conclusion?
Also, if you put this in the context of the OP, then RBAC is immaterial to the Snowden case. That makes the article smell even more like deliberate spin-doctoring.
> Again, if sysadmins are the only employees who can make such transitions, you have far fewer people you need to watch -- a net win.
Then the question is, "Were they watching admins like Snowden well enough?"