>Nevertheless, the difference in intelligence (and thus scope of morality) between humans and most animals is so vast in degree that it becomes a difference in

>Nevertheless, the difference in intelligence (and thus scope of morality) between humans and most animals is so vast in degree that it becomes a difference in kind. The qualifier "most" kind of sinks your battleship on this one. I don't disagree with what you said, per se, but with its implications. Let's say an animal's intelligence is not different in kind to ours if its intelligence is at least (1-alpha)I, where I is standard human intelligence and for some low alpha. But what about animals of at least (1-alpha)^2 * I intelligence? By this definition, they would be different in kind to us, but not different in kind to a creature not different in kind to us (one with exactly (1-alpha)I intelligence). The point I'm trying to get at here is that while our intelligence seems different in kind to that of a dog, there might be a reasonably smooth intelligence slope via a number of other species. So I think it might be questionable to assume that our intelligence is qualitatively different. That said, I do think there are certain emergent phenomena that occur only at higher intelligence. Which, I suppose, could be what you meant in the first place.