>Think of an employee as operating within a sphere of trust -- a set of assets and functions he or she has access to. Organizations act in their best interest b

>Think of an employee as operating within a sphere of trust -- a set of assets and functions he or she has access to. Organizations act in their best interest by making that sphere as small as possible. The idea is that if someone turns out to be untrustworthy, he or she can only do so much damage. This is where the NSA failed with Snowden. And if you read easily between the lines, this is where the NSA failed us as well. Snowden's sphere of access was very large. He broke org procedure for the good of all Americans and net users on the planet. What is implied is that existing analysts in like positions have similar access, and can break org procedures for nefarious purposes (indeed, as they already have countless times according to reporting), and no amount of official gov't reassurances on "checks and balances" or "proper procedures" can wipe this fact away. I wonder how many roles at the NSA have inflated spheres of trust, and about all the little and big ways their operators break org procedures all the time...and especially for what reasons...