The argument is sort of tautological: the uncommon, huge exits that pay the bills for investors are relatively rare. Well, obviously. The author makes some at

The argument is sort of tautological: the uncommon, huge exits that pay the bills for investors are relatively rare. Well, obviously. The author makes some attempt to establish that they're increasingly rare, but she doesn't talk too much about trends--most of her evidence is anecdotal. And it's not really fair to compare today's exits to the ones from the late 90s, since many of the latter were irrationally huge. What's more, she leaves out recent ten-figure acquisitions like DoubleClick and Skype. That said, her basic point is certainly right: the average VC can't be as selective today as in 2001, so they're often investing at valuations higher than they'd like. That's unfavorable. But I don't think it's calamitous.