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Your scenarios do not envision stalking--an attacker who wishes to access your accounts from another computer at another time, without your knowledge. If you s
by snowwrestler 13y ago
Your scenarios do not envision stalking--an attacker who wishes to access your accounts from another computer at another time, without your knowledge.
If you sit down at my unlocked session of Gmail, yes, you can read my mail or send email. But you can't get my Gmail password--which would allow you to log into my account later from your computer.
If I'm using Safari, you have to look in the OS X Keychain Access software, which hides passwords by default. If you check the box for "show password", you have to enter my OS X password before it will show it to you. You can't get it.
If I'm using Chrome, you can just go to the saved password interface and write down what you see. Stalking achieved.
- ZeroGravitas 13y agoYou go to the log in page, the browser fills the password for you, bookmarklet to change the password field to text, there is your password.
- MichaelGG 13y agoMy threat model is any untusted subject accessing my computer. What's why I lock it even to walk to the other side of the room. This requires any attack to open laptop, remove epoxy on RAM, then quickly switch my RAM out and read keys. I don't know the details of the OS X keychain. If they indeed validate programmatic access to the keychain by authenticating the code executing (that is, verifying Chrome by Google is accessing the same data stored), then sure, it's possible to do somewhat better. But if the browser prepopulates fields and they are inspectable, that defeats the purpose, yet again.