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An algorithm that can spot and kill Twitterbots before they start spamming
- AznHisoka 13y agoI feel you can get 80% of the way there just by banning the major cloud/dedicated server hosts (ie AWS, Rackspace, Linode)
- driverdan 13y agoHad you read the paper you'd know you're wrong. Most of the IPs are from botnets.
- tbirdz 13y ago>falsely identifying accounts as fake only 0.0058 percent of the time (or about 6 out of 10,000) That may sound impressive, but if there is 554,750,000 twitter users [1], 554750000 * (6/10000) is still 332,850 people who would have a false positive. [1]: http://www.statisticbrain.com/twitter-statistics/ http://www.statisticbrain.com/twitter-statistics/
- random42 13y agoThat is the bane of Machine Learning algorithms. They cannot be 100% accurate. That is why for destructive measures, you need to establish human oversight when using such algorithms.
- _greim_ 13y agoHowever, humans are also machine learning algorithms, and may or may not have a better false positive rate than 0.0058%.
- 100k 13y agoI have a particular tweet that must've gotten into a twitter bot database. It's old but it gets favorited on a regular basis by bots which are (I'm assuming) trying to look like real users. Not really related to the article, but I've found it interesting. Anyone else see this behavior?
- atlbeer 13y agoYep. I have a tweet that gets a random favorite every few weeks. It's months old and only bots every hit it. That tweet and only that tweet over and over.
- chewxy 13y agoSame here. It was a tweet about my typo from "python" to "pythong"[0]. Every few weeks I would get a random favourite from a plausible sounding name. They're all bots [0] https://twitter.com/chewxy/status/333827059908497409 https://twitter.com/chewxy/status/333827059908497409
- mistercow 13y agoThe problem with looking at registration to identify bots is that it's easy to counteract. Right now, bots use simple methods for generating names, and fill out the form instantly, because there's no incentive not to. Neither of those factors is difficult to change. This article also commits the cardinal sin of telling us the false positive rate without also telling us the false negative rate, or the base rate. You can't tell much from "falsely flagged about 6 out of 10,000" alone.
- solistice 13y agoI predict roughly a month till they've circumvented it, if not sooner. A lot of these bots are simple contraptions, and simulating the way real people sign up to services seems to boil down to putting in some timers and a new name generating algorithm.
- mistercow 13y agoDepends on what you're going by. I'd give a 90% confidence interval for the first spam bot being modified to circumvent it between 1 hour after the paper was presented, and 1 day after it hit any site on the level of HN. But if we're talking about some higher degree of prevalence among spam bots, it will be a bit longer. I expect that there are a lot of spam bots out there that are running passively and haven't been touched by their creators in years.
- petercooper 13y agoI think Twitter's own system for doing this is a bit eager. I registered a new account the other day, followed the obligatory number of people they make you follow on signup, put in some basic profile info, then logged out to finish set up the next day. Logged in the next day.. account has been suspended for being suspicious. Ha!
- denzil_correa 13y agoFor full details, please read the paper published at USENIX 2013 [0]. Some points which I found interesting + 6% of the fraudulent accounts purchased are resold (Table 2) + India is the most popular location to register fraudulent accounts (Table 3) + Hotmail is the most popular e-mail service used to confirm fraudulent Twitter accounts (Table 5) + The algorithm to "retroactively predict" fraudulent account is not based on any popular machine learning technique. Most of it looks like regex matching patterns. + The evaluation of the algorithm was done on 4,800 random sample Twitter accounts (200 each merchant) out of the available 121,027 accounts on which the longitudinal study was performed [0] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity13/sec13-paper_thomas.pdf https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurit...