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Extended explosion swabbing -- and improved and more discrete equipment -- came about after the failed attempt to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 to Detro

Extended explosion swabbing -- and improved and more discrete equipment -- came about after the failed attempt to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 to Detroit in 2009 (an almost tragedy that many quickly forget). In earlier iterations of spam filters, it would simply prefix the subject with [SPAM], just as explosion detectors caught lots of things and they quickly dismissed them. As it got better it started moving them to a spam folder. Now it simply moves them directly to deleted. Of course the same thing happens with explosion detectors, where initially it picked up many similar compounds, and eventually started getting much more discrete, and the probability that it actually caught something of significance went from "not really" to "might actually be something real". Traveling in 2013 is not the same as traveling in 2002. Traveling in New York City is not the same as traveling in Austrlia. All of these are factors that influence the probability that technology is a viable input, and the corresponding risk factors.

justin66 13y ago
> Of course the same thing happens with explosion detectors, where initially it picked up many similar compounds, and eventually started getting much more discrete, and the probability that it actually caught something of significance went from "not really" to "might actually be something real". Unless you've got some hard data on false positives, I don't believe it for a minute. As far as I can tell the equipment's warning value has gone from "almost certainly not explosives" to "almost certainly not explosives." That doesn't make the equipment useless (well, it might) but it'd be nifty if the people operating it understood its pretty obvious limitations. Remember why we're even having this conversation.
- corresation 13y ago
  I don't have hard data (the actual details are often considered confidential), but for the marketing claims of the various makers who all trumpet greater selectivity and the rejection of false positives. Which makes sense, as security is a huge, incredibly competitive industry, and these people are all competing for the world's paranoia dollars. Because the TSA gained nothing wasting their time on this. There are the normal conspiratorial claims among the comments that someone triggered the "brown guy" button just to harass him (again, only someone who has never been near a large North American city could say such a thing), for what? What did the TSA, NYPD, FBI, and whoever else gain from this giant waste of time? Something triggered on a molecule or taggant that they couldn't easily exclude, so they tried to help him assist them in excluding it. He couldn't, so they had to exhaust all avenues. Unless they have countless agents and countless rooms, this isn't something they do with any regularity at all.
  - justin66 13y ago
    > I don't have hard data (the actual details are often considered confidential), but for the marketing claims of the various makers who all trumpet greater selectivity and the rejection of false positives. Which makes sense, as security is a huge, incredibly competitive industry, and these people are all competing for the world's paranoia dollars. Putting aside the merit of the idea of that the government bidding process ends with purchase of the best product, it's worth noting that just like with the government agents, the manufacturer isn't actually liable to anyone who suffers when its machines produce a false positive. Insofar as the manufacturer has any incentive to improve in this regard, its incentive comes from the same people who are putting on this security theater. > Because the TSA gained nothing wasting their time on this. [blah blah] What did the TSA, NYPD, FBI, and whoever else gain from this giant waste of time? Not sure why you threw this in here but it's so wrong that it's kind of hard to know where to begin. First, the superficial and obvious: TSA and NYPD are paid overtime. They had MONEY to gain from this exercise. Their financial incentives are exactly opposed to those of the person they are detaining. Less superficial, perhaps equally obvious: a bureaucracy does stuff because that's the stuff the bureaucracy does. It's a big, mindless machine whose prime directive is to continue to exist. Everyone understands that they need to be seen to be DOING SOMETHING, and there are plenty of true believers who think doing that something is the most important thing in the world. That's the reason for some much of the crud we deal with now. You might have made the mistake of thinking we're dealing with fully rational actors here. Congratulations if you've never worked for a bureaucracy and you don't get any of this. > Something triggered on a molecule or taggant that they couldn't easily exclude, so they tried to help him assist them in excluding it. He couldn't, so they had to exhaust all avenues. Orwell would be proud.
    - corresation 13y ago
      So you're anti-government and cynical. Welcome to about 99% of the online community. There are people who actually want to blow up planes. There have been a number of attempts. These machines detect the things that are found in bombs. There are a lot of examples of "security theater" (moreso in the private industry, it should be noted, like the ridiculously useless badges and disaffected employees at most office buildings), but explosives material detectors most certainly are not. One day we'll walk down a Total Recall type hall and it will know who we are and everything on or about us, but until then we have some inconveniences. And groan, good old Orwell makes a cliched showing. Yes, we all read 1984 in grade school. Pulling it out as a trope to anything the government does (even where entirely rational and related to an actual threat, and overwhelming painless and transparent) is boorish internet pundit behavior.
cwkoss 13y ago
I don't think explosion swabbing detectors are operating in a free market: they are built off funds from government contracts. There isn't much reason to expect a similar pace of innovation as for email servers.
- mpyne 13y ago
  Why not? Money is money, after all. The contracts don't say how to do it, they say what to do. There's plenty of room for competition in these types of things, from how to meet the Performance Work Statement all the way to how to setup the internal org. structure to most efficiently handle contract compliance overhead.

justin66 13y ago

> Of course the same thing happens with explosion detectors, where initially it picked up many similar compounds, and eventually started getting much more discrete, and the probability that it actually caught something of significance went from "not really" to "might actually be something real". Unless you've got some hard data on false positives, I don't believe it for a minute. As far as I can tell the equipment's warning value has gone from "almost certainly not explosives" to "almost certainly not explosives." That doesn't make the equipment useless (well, it might) but it'd be nifty if the people operating it understood its pretty obvious limitations. Remember why we're even having this conversation.

corresation 13y ago
I don't have hard data (the actual details are often considered confidential), but for the marketing claims of the various makers who all trumpet greater selectivity and the rejection of false positives. Which makes sense, as security is a huge, incredibly competitive industry, and these people are all competing for the world's paranoia dollars. Because the TSA gained nothing wasting their time on this. There are the normal conspiratorial claims among the comments that someone triggered the "brown guy" button just to harass him (again, only someone who has never been near a large North American city could say such a thing), for what? What did the TSA, NYPD, FBI, and whoever else gain from this giant waste of time? Something triggered on a molecule or taggant that they couldn't easily exclude, so they tried to help him assist them in excluding it. He couldn't, so they had to exhaust all avenues. Unless they have countless agents and countless rooms, this isn't something they do with any regularity at all.
- justin66 13y ago
  > I don't have hard data (the actual details are often considered confidential), but for the marketing claims of the various makers who all trumpet greater selectivity and the rejection of false positives. Which makes sense, as security is a huge, incredibly competitive industry, and these people are all competing for the world's paranoia dollars. Putting aside the merit of the idea of that the government bidding process ends with purchase of the best product, it's worth noting that just like with the government agents, the manufacturer isn't actually liable to anyone who suffers when its machines produce a false positive. Insofar as the manufacturer has any incentive to improve in this regard, its incentive comes from the same people who are putting on this security theater. > Because the TSA gained nothing wasting their time on this. [blah blah] What did the TSA, NYPD, FBI, and whoever else gain from this giant waste of time? Not sure why you threw this in here but it's so wrong that it's kind of hard to know where to begin. First, the superficial and obvious: TSA and NYPD are paid overtime. They had MONEY to gain from this exercise. Their financial incentives are exactly opposed to those of the person they are detaining. Less superficial, perhaps equally obvious: a bureaucracy does stuff because that's the stuff the bureaucracy does. It's a big, mindless machine whose prime directive is to continue to exist. Everyone understands that they need to be seen to be DOING SOMETHING, and there are plenty of true believers who think doing that something is the most important thing in the world. That's the reason for some much of the crud we deal with now. You might have made the mistake of thinking we're dealing with fully rational actors here. Congratulations if you've never worked for a bureaucracy and you don't get any of this. > Something triggered on a molecule or taggant that they couldn't easily exclude, so they tried to help him assist them in excluding it. He couldn't, so they had to exhaust all avenues. Orwell would be proud.
  - corresation 13y ago
    So you're anti-government and cynical. Welcome to about 99% of the online community. There are people who actually want to blow up planes. There have been a number of attempts. These machines detect the things that are found in bombs. There are a lot of examples of "security theater" (moreso in the private industry, it should be noted, like the ridiculously useless badges and disaffected employees at most office buildings), but explosives material detectors most certainly are not. One day we'll walk down a Total Recall type hall and it will know who we are and everything on or about us, but until then we have some inconveniences. And groan, good old Orwell makes a cliched showing. Yes, we all read 1984 in grade school. Pulling it out as a trope to anything the government does (even where entirely rational and related to an actual threat, and overwhelming painless and transparent) is boorish internet pundit behavior.

cwkoss 13y ago

I don't think explosion swabbing detectors are operating in a free market: they are built off funds from government contracts. There isn't much reason to expect a similar pace of innovation as for email servers.

mpyne 13y ago
Why not? Money is money, after all. The contracts don't say how to do it, they say what to do. There's plenty of room for competition in these types of things, from how to meet the Performance Work Statement all the way to how to setup the internal org. structure to most efficiently handle contract compliance overhead.