10 ms·

Mistakes aren't deterministic, they are largely probabilistic. While ritual suicide might make the victims of an accident feel better, they are ultimately unpr

Mistakes aren't deterministic, they are largely probabilistic. While ritual suicide might make the victims of an accident feel better, they are ultimately unproductive - there are many classes of disastrous errors that have nothing to do with negligence. Not to mention also, even in incidents with a preventable cause, it is exceedingly rare for there to be a singular cause. Chernobyl, for example, was the culmination of a vast number of errors and safety lapses. Should the entire plant workforce kill themselves? Things like nuclear meltdowns are black swan events, with a multitude of causes and guilt. What you're basically suggesting is that, in the case of such a black swan event, we will kill off a large proportion of the only people who can prevent it from happening again.

samatman 13y ago
While I do think a "vast number of errors and safety lapses" is unlikely to come out of a cult (note the word) of engineering which embraces ritual suicide as the cost of failure... This is about human psychology, rather than reliability in the engineering sense. I truly believe it would lead to better safety, but not perfect safety. The idea is that yes, all or most of the engineers involved in a nuclear accident of any significance would kill themselves. Not only would their knowledge be lost, their fellow nuclear engineers would carve their names on a black stone, bury it in the earth beneath their corrupted stain, and never mention them again. Their families would be rewarded only if they showed honor by staying to fight the nuclear corruption, and dying honorably when the disaster is contained. This won't work perfectly, but it would let society as a whole live with the contradiction inherent in nuclear power: it sustains us, while running the risk of turning our children's children into walking bags of cancerous mutation. This is also pure thought experiment: what would it take to have a culture of safety as serious as the threat of nuclear disaster? I'm not willing to pay this price, and yet, I'm thoroughly familiar with the mass balance equations governing extractable energy and haven't a clue how to post-carbon without at least some nuclear.
- pdonis 13y ago
  running the risk of turning our children's children into walking bags of cancerous mutation. But here's the thing: we have already had two "nuclear accidents of any significance": Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Neither of those came even remotely close to "turning our children's children into walking bags of cancerous mutation". Nor will Fukushima. Yes, it's very bad for people near the plant, and for fishermen in the surrounding waters. But on a global scale, it's just not that big. what would it take to have a culture of safety as serious as the threat of nuclear disaster? Wrong question; the answer to it ask you ask it is that we already have a culture of safety at least that serious, with regard to nuclear power, because we treat nuclear power far more strictly than we treat other sources of power (like coal) that pose greater overall risk to humans. If we're going to effectively ban nuclear reactors because we're worried about radiation, we should also ban coal because we're worried about deaths from mining. And we should ban oil because of the risk of something like the Deepwater Horizon spill. There isn't a simple solution to any of this; but a good start would be to be open and realistic about all the risks of all power sources.
  - redblacktree 13y ago
    Yes, but I'm not a miner. Coal is much less dangerous for those who live near the power plant.
    - pdonis 13y ago
      Does that mean you're not concerned about the deaths from coal mining? You're only concerned about the risks that impact you personally? That doesn't seem to be a common attitude: if it were, nobody would have complained about the Deepwater Horizon spill except people who lived on the Gulf coast. (And nobody would complain about nuclear power except those who had to live near a plant.)
      - pessimizer 13y ago
        >Does that mean you're not concerned about the deaths from coal mining? No, it doesn't. It's a difference between risks taken willingly by the people who benefit from the outcome, and risks imposed on people who don't have a choice and don't stand to benefit. And it's obvious that it was meant that way. Don't be deliberately obtuse.
- dsuth 13y ago
  > This is about human psychology, rather than reliability in the engineering sense. I truly believe it would lead to better safety, but not perfect safety. The problem is that you have no idea how Process Safety works, or even what it is, judging by your posts. As the parent to this post explained, these major hazard events are probabilistic, not deterministic. That means that they can never be completely eliminated, only guarded against and reduced to the point that the benefit is understood to outweigh the risk. There will always be risk. You suggest that the engineers responsible for designing the plant should commit suicide if this once in a million year event takes place. What about the businessmen who accepted the risk? Or the government who stipulated what the tolerable risk was? Or the people who moved nearby, aware of the risk? Or the workers on the plant who, knowing what the correct maintenance procedures were to keep the plant safely operational, ignored them because it was 'too hard'? What if the root cause was a vector of risk which was poorly understood by everyone at the time? Or the engineering specification was correct, but the materials vendor skimped on QA? Or were lied to by one of their plants? Or a subcontractor of the plant? Etc etc etc. What you propose, even as a thought experiment, is futile. Because even if you could reduce the risk to only systematic errors made in engineering design, if there was a perceived need or benefit to design the plant, you could always find a group of engineers desperate enough, naive enough, or vain enough to take on the risk. And therefore society as a whole would not be safer. As it happens there's a large body of engineering knowledge which goes into making dangerous plants 'safe enough' to outweigh the risks to their workers, owners, and society at large. It's not foolproof, but arguably it does a good job of allowing societies to benefit from the dangerous processes we seem so desperate to use. And don't kid yourself - just because these massive events incur a media feeding frenzy, doesn't mean smaller hazardous occurrences don't affect the lives of thousands of people every year. Should we kill everyone who could in some way be held accountable for another's death or injury? In short, don't let fear guide you into silly knee-jerk reactions. There are massive problems inherent with dangerous processes, and most of them relate to the very human failures of laziness and greed. We're working to improve the situation constantly, but it's a long road and a constant battle.
pdonis 13y ago
Things like nuclear meltdowns are black swan events, with a multitude of causes and guilt. I'm not advocating ritual suicide, but I think it's worth noting that in the case of Fukushima, there is an easily identifiable single root cause to all the current problems: the fact that the backup diesel generators and the switchgear for them were sited behind a seawall that was overcome by the tsunami. If they had been on higher ground, none of this would have happened; there would have been a continuous supply of cooling water to the reactor cores and things would have shut down normally. The process that led to that siting of the backup generators should be fairly easily traceable, as compared to the design process for the entire reactor complex.
- potatolicious 13y ago
  > "the fact that the backup diesel generators and the switchgear for them were sited behind a seawall that was overcome by the tsunami" Sure, but who's responsible for that? I don't mean to say that there must be many technical causes of incidents, but rather that it is almost impossible to find a situation where there is a singular human cause. The multitude of engineers that saw the plans before they went final? The managers who pushed for the generators to be placed there in the first place? The contractors who built it knowing full well that the design was garbage? How high up does it go, and how many degrees removed from the situation do we require before you're absolved of guilt? We could do something silly to consolidate the guilt, like, "the last person to stamp the designs gets the blame", but that seems like it would encourage a culture of hot-potatoing instead, especially if the stakes are your own life ;) To put a more extreme example of it: a bus driver falls asleep at the wheel, jumps a curb, and kills a person. Do we punish the driver for his negligence, or his shift supervisor for threatening him into taking an extra-long shift, or someone even further up who knowingly encouraged a culture of overwork?
  - pdonis 13y ago
    it is almost impossible to find a situation where there is a singular human cause. But if you can focus in on a single technical decision that had such a large impact, you can at least focus attention on how that particular technical decision got made. Yes, many humans will have been involved even in that single technical decision; but it's still a lot more manageable to look into how it got made than to look at how the entire plant got designed. We could do something silly to consolidate the guilt I'm not talking about guilt; I said I wasn't advocating ritual suicide. I'm talking about how to prevent it from happening again. To do that, you need to be able to focus on something that can actually be changed. Take your bus driver example: Do we punish the driver for his negligence, or his shift supervisor for threatening him into taking an extra-long shift, or someone even further up who knowingly encouraged a culture of overwork? Depends on the facts. Was the driver negligent? Could he have reasonably predicted that he would fall asleep at the wheel? How could he have acted on such a prediction? Did the supervisor actually threaten him into taking an extra-long shift? If so, how did he get away with it? Aren't there rules about preventing driver fatigue? (Certainly commercial airline crews have strict rules about how long they can fly before they have to rest.) If not, why not? Is there a systemic culture of overwork, encouraged from higher up? Do bus drivers in this company routinely drive longer hours than the industry average? Than the average in other similar occupations? The point is that if you can focus in on specific causal chains, you can direct efforts at changing them. In the case of Fukushima, if you can focus in on how the technical decision to site the backup generators that way got made, you can direct efforts at improving that process. Did the engineers just not realize that siting the backup generators that way was a bad idea? Was the question never even asked? Or did the engineers realize it, but management overruled them? Or did the original design have them sited differently, but time pressure during construction persuaded someone (not the engineers or managers who did the original design) to change the location in order to meet some deadline? All this, btw, reinforces your point that ritual suicide doesn't help anything.
dripton 13y ago
The engineers don't necessarily have enough power for that to work. And the current engineers on site aren't necessarily those at fault for a disaster that was caused by incorrect design or construction 30 years ago. What I would like to see is mandatory escrow of a large percentage of profits from highly-profitable, possibly-disaster-prone industries. If you go disaster-free for 20 years you get your escrowed money with interest. If not, you lose (an appropriate amount of) it.

samatman 13y ago

While I do think a "vast number of errors and safety lapses" is unlikely to come out of a cult (note the word) of engineering which embraces ritual suicide as the cost of failure... This is about human psychology, rather than reliability in the engineering sense. I truly believe it would lead to better safety, but not perfect safety. The idea is that yes, all or most of the engineers involved in a nuclear accident of any significance would kill themselves. Not only would their knowledge be lost, their fellow nuclear engineers would carve their names on a black stone, bury it in the earth beneath their corrupted stain, and never mention them again. Their families would be rewarded only if they showed honor by staying to fight the nuclear corruption, and dying honorably when the disaster is contained. This won't work perfectly, but it would let society as a whole live with the contradiction inherent in nuclear power: it sustains us, while running the risk of turning our children's children into walking bags of cancerous mutation. This is also pure thought experiment: what would it take to have a culture of safety as serious as the threat of nuclear disaster? I'm not willing to pay this price, and yet, I'm thoroughly familiar with the mass balance equations governing extractable energy and haven't a clue how to post-carbon without at least some nuclear.

pdonis 13y ago
running the risk of turning our children's children into walking bags of cancerous mutation. But here's the thing: we have already had two "nuclear accidents of any significance": Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Neither of those came even remotely close to "turning our children's children into walking bags of cancerous mutation". Nor will Fukushima. Yes, it's very bad for people near the plant, and for fishermen in the surrounding waters. But on a global scale, it's just not that big. what would it take to have a culture of safety as serious as the threat of nuclear disaster? Wrong question; the answer to it ask you ask it is that we already have a culture of safety at least that serious, with regard to nuclear power, because we treat nuclear power far more strictly than we treat other sources of power (like coal) that pose greater overall risk to humans. If we're going to effectively ban nuclear reactors because we're worried about radiation, we should also ban coal because we're worried about deaths from mining. And we should ban oil because of the risk of something like the Deepwater Horizon spill. There isn't a simple solution to any of this; but a good start would be to be open and realistic about all the risks of all power sources.
- redblacktree 13y ago
  Yes, but I'm not a miner. Coal is much less dangerous for those who live near the power plant.
  - pdonis 13y ago
    Does that mean you're not concerned about the deaths from coal mining? You're only concerned about the risks that impact you personally? That doesn't seem to be a common attitude: if it were, nobody would have complained about the Deepwater Horizon spill except people who lived on the Gulf coast. (And nobody would complain about nuclear power except those who had to live near a plant.)
    - pessimizer 13y ago
      >Does that mean you're not concerned about the deaths from coal mining? No, it doesn't. It's a difference between risks taken willingly by the people who benefit from the outcome, and risks imposed on people who don't have a choice and don't stand to benefit. And it's obvious that it was meant that way. Don't be deliberately obtuse.
dsuth 13y ago
> This is about human psychology, rather than reliability in the engineering sense. I truly believe it would lead to better safety, but not perfect safety. The problem is that you have no idea how Process Safety works, or even what it is, judging by your posts. As the parent to this post explained, these major hazard events are probabilistic, not deterministic. That means that they can never be completely eliminated, only guarded against and reduced to the point that the benefit is understood to outweigh the risk. There will always be risk. You suggest that the engineers responsible for designing the plant should commit suicide if this once in a million year event takes place. What about the businessmen who accepted the risk? Or the government who stipulated what the tolerable risk was? Or the people who moved nearby, aware of the risk? Or the workers on the plant who, knowing what the correct maintenance procedures were to keep the plant safely operational, ignored them because it was 'too hard'? What if the root cause was a vector of risk which was poorly understood by everyone at the time? Or the engineering specification was correct, but the materials vendor skimped on QA? Or were lied to by one of their plants? Or a subcontractor of the plant? Etc etc etc. What you propose, even as a thought experiment, is futile. Because even if you could reduce the risk to only systematic errors made in engineering design, if there was a perceived need or benefit to design the plant, you could always find a group of engineers desperate enough, naive enough, or vain enough to take on the risk. And therefore society as a whole would not be safer. As it happens there's a large body of engineering knowledge which goes into making dangerous plants 'safe enough' to outweigh the risks to their workers, owners, and society at large. It's not foolproof, but arguably it does a good job of allowing societies to benefit from the dangerous processes we seem so desperate to use. And don't kid yourself - just because these massive events incur a media feeding frenzy, doesn't mean smaller hazardous occurrences don't affect the lives of thousands of people every year. Should we kill everyone who could in some way be held accountable for another's death or injury? In short, don't let fear guide you into silly knee-jerk reactions. There are massive problems inherent with dangerous processes, and most of them relate to the very human failures of laziness and greed. We're working to improve the situation constantly, but it's a long road and a constant battle.

pdonis 13y ago

Things like nuclear meltdowns are black swan events, with a multitude of causes and guilt. I'm not advocating ritual suicide, but I think it's worth noting that in the case of Fukushima, there is an easily identifiable single root cause to all the current problems: the fact that the backup diesel generators and the switchgear for them were sited behind a seawall that was overcome by the tsunami. If they had been on higher ground, none of this would have happened; there would have been a continuous supply of cooling water to the reactor cores and things would have shut down normally. The process that led to that siting of the backup generators should be fairly easily traceable, as compared to the design process for the entire reactor complex.

potatolicious 13y ago
> "the fact that the backup diesel generators and the switchgear for them were sited behind a seawall that was overcome by the tsunami" Sure, but who's responsible for that? I don't mean to say that there must be many technical causes of incidents, but rather that it is almost impossible to find a situation where there is a singular human cause. The multitude of engineers that saw the plans before they went final? The managers who pushed for the generators to be placed there in the first place? The contractors who built it knowing full well that the design was garbage? How high up does it go, and how many degrees removed from the situation do we require before you're absolved of guilt? We could do something silly to consolidate the guilt, like, "the last person to stamp the designs gets the blame", but that seems like it would encourage a culture of hot-potatoing instead, especially if the stakes are your own life ;) To put a more extreme example of it: a bus driver falls asleep at the wheel, jumps a curb, and kills a person. Do we punish the driver for his negligence, or his shift supervisor for threatening him into taking an extra-long shift, or someone even further up who knowingly encouraged a culture of overwork?
- pdonis 13y ago
  it is almost impossible to find a situation where there is a singular human cause. But if you can focus in on a single technical decision that had such a large impact, you can at least focus attention on how that particular technical decision got made. Yes, many humans will have been involved even in that single technical decision; but it's still a lot more manageable to look into how it got made than to look at how the entire plant got designed. We could do something silly to consolidate the guilt I'm not talking about guilt; I said I wasn't advocating ritual suicide. I'm talking about how to prevent it from happening again. To do that, you need to be able to focus on something that can actually be changed. Take your bus driver example: Do we punish the driver for his negligence, or his shift supervisor for threatening him into taking an extra-long shift, or someone even further up who knowingly encouraged a culture of overwork? Depends on the facts. Was the driver negligent? Could he have reasonably predicted that he would fall asleep at the wheel? How could he have acted on such a prediction? Did the supervisor actually threaten him into taking an extra-long shift? If so, how did he get away with it? Aren't there rules about preventing driver fatigue? (Certainly commercial airline crews have strict rules about how long they can fly before they have to rest.) If not, why not? Is there a systemic culture of overwork, encouraged from higher up? Do bus drivers in this company routinely drive longer hours than the industry average? Than the average in other similar occupations? The point is that if you can focus in on specific causal chains, you can direct efforts at changing them. In the case of Fukushima, if you can focus in on how the technical decision to site the backup generators that way got made, you can direct efforts at improving that process. Did the engineers just not realize that siting the backup generators that way was a bad idea? Was the question never even asked? Or did the engineers realize it, but management overruled them? Or did the original design have them sited differently, but time pressure during construction persuaded someone (not the engineers or managers who did the original design) to change the location in order to meet some deadline? All this, btw, reinforces your point that ritual suicide doesn't help anything.

dripton 13y ago

The engineers don't necessarily have enough power for that to work. And the current engineers on site aren't necessarily those at fault for a disaster that was caused by incorrect design or construction 30 years ago. What I would like to see is mandatory escrow of a large percentage of profits from highly-profitable, possibly-disaster-prone industries. If you go disaster-free for 20 years you get your escrowed money with interest. If not, you lose (an appropriate amount of) it.