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The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator Revisited
- agf 13y agoA recent, related paper: https://cs.nyu.edu/~dodis/ps/rng.pdf https://cs.nyu.edu/~dodis/ps/rng.pdf It doesn't appear to be mentioned in "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator Revisited", which repeatedly refers to a 2006 paper as its precursor. Security Analysis of Pseudo-Random Number Generators with Input: /dev/random is not Robust Abstract: A pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is a deterministic algorithm that produces numbers whose distribution is indistinguishable from uniform. A formal security model for PRNGs with input was proposed in 2005 by Barak and Halevi (BH). This model involves an internal state that is refreshed with a (potentially biased) external random source, and a cryptographic function that outputs random numbers from the continually internal state. In this work we extend the BH model to also include a new security property capturing how it should accumulate the entropy of the input data into the internal state after state compromise. This property states that a good PRNG should be able to eventually recover from compromise even if the entropy is injected into the system at a very slow pace, and expresses the real-life expected behavior of existing PRNG designs. Unfortunately, we show that neither the model nor the specific PRNG construction proposed by Barak and Halevi meet this new property, despite meeting a weaker robustness notion introduced by BH. From a practical side, we also give a precise assessment of the security of the two Linux PRNGs, /dev/random and /dev/urandom. In particular, we show several attacks proving that these PRNGs are not robust according to our definition, and do not accumulate entropy properly. These attacks are due to the vulnerabilities of the entropy estimator and the internal mixing function of the Linux PRNGs. These attacks against the Linux PRNG show that it does not satisfy the "robustness" notion of security, but it remains unclear if these attacks lead to actual exploitable vulnerabilities in practice. Finally, we propose a simple and very efficient PRNG construction that is provably robust in our new and stronger adversarial model. We therefore recommend to use this construction whenever a PRNG with input is used for cryptography
- tveita 13y agoIt doesn't mention it because this is from 2012 (http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251 http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251) and the paper you mentioned is from 2013. (http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338 http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338) Here's a comment from DJB regarding the 2013 paper: https://twitter.com/hashbreaker/status/342320351776231425 https://twitter.com/hashbreaker/status/342320351776231425 > http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338 http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338 advertises "provable security" while sacrificing actual security. Don't use it.
- cpeterso 13y agoWhy do most academic papers not include a publication date? Is this because the paper might be republished in different journals or conference proceedings? It's difficult to know whether you are reading a paper that is recent or five years old.