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It's a cute argument, based on the number of universe simulations - if there are heaps of them, the odds are ours is one. But this argument misses something -
by 6ren 13y ago
It's a cute argument, based on the number of universe simulations - if there are heaps of them, the odds are ours is one.
But this argument misses something - what about the number of people being simulated? If there are many more than actual people, the same argument applies. You are likely simulated.
But, you may object, if you simulate a person, don't you need to simulate a universe? Well, yes, but only the bits the person can see. Like in a fps, it doesn't render the entire world from every possible perspective - just one. Much easier (and, dare I say it, more likely than simulating an entire universe). This is just Descartes systematically deceiving demon + how many there are.
A second objection is that it would be more efficient to share the same world across many simulated people. This might be true, but the underlying question remains: to determine how likely you are simulated, we need to consider the simulated vs real people ratio, not the simulated vs real universes.
PS: If we're going all Vishnu's dream, all bets are off. Why should it in anyway be bound by the observations we have gathered? For example, why assume the simulation must be finite - any justification that we can generalise from our own observations is parochial and anthropocentric.
Of course, it is simpler to imagine (and probably, to do), if it's a simulation of the actual universe. So let's use the argument again: of all the simulated universes, how many will be of the true universe, and how many will be bizarre variations (which ours would be)? Of course, we cannot hope to estimate these probabilities for an arbitrarily different parent universe - even less so than to predict what that parent universe would be like! But it seems pointless to simulate an exact copy... for us, iteration-like variations, or of fiction seem more likely.
- archivator 13y agoAs soon as I saw the title, I knew Nick Bostrom would be involved. And therein lies chaos. First, to clarify something from the article - Bostrom's "posthuman" civilization is not strictly about the singularity but about almost unbounded capabilities. Building computers out of planets would be within reach for such a civilization. Think Culture, not Neuromancer. The ratio of simulated people vs people in the actual universe was "addressed" in one of Bostrom's subsequent papers but in a completely ad hoc if-you-do-this-then-you-prove-my-point way. Here's some arguments against it - http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Simulation_argument#Calculating_the_Probability_of_Simulation_with_the_Bostrom_Equation http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Simulation_argument#Calculating... All in all, the SimArg is a nice thought but it's so easy to poke holes without first becoming a posthuman civilization that it loses what little stability it might have had.
- snowwrestler 13y agoI feel like Bostrom uses his first 2 conditions to constrain probabilities until the 3rd seems likely. Is this insightful or a trick? I would argue it's a lot closer to a trick, since conditions 1 and 2 are futures we hope for (that we survive and become technologically advanced)--so we tend to overestimate their actual probability. Think of it this way: the total probability that we are in a simulation should be the sum of all future states in which our descendents create adequate simulations, divided by the total number of all possible future states--which is nearly infinite. Therefore the probability that we are in a simulation now is actually nearly zero.
- archivator 13y agoI think calling it a trick is unfair. It's not just P(C3), it's really P(C3 | !C1 && !C2), where C1 and C2 are really big events, so the fact they haven't occurred narrows the search space quite a bit. Remember, he's not just talking about any conciousness simulations but a specific type - ancestor simulations, which allows him to pull more rabbits out of his hat than might normally be able to hide in there.