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... or make sure that your cloud-based resources, whatever they are, only see ciphertext, and access them only through heavily secured machines that you hold lo
by rst 13y ago
... or make sure that your cloud-based resources, whatever they are, only see ciphertext, and access them only through heavily secured machines that you hold locally. Which requires the attacker to compromise your laptop, or phone, or whatever. (Which is almost certainly still possible for an attacker with the resources of a major government that decides you're of sufficient interest, but it raises the bar a bit.)
- Terretta 13y agoHow do you propose bootstrapping the cipher onto a "known compromised" machine in a known compromised environment?
- rst 13y agoUse full end-to-end encryption. The "known compromised" machine doesn't do the encryption or decryption in the first place; that's done at the physically secure (you hope!) endpoints.
- Terretta 13y agoBy cloud resource, did you mean storage? In which case, sure. But if you meant to do work "in the cloud" on the cipher text's content, the under-bad-actor-control machine is one of the "ends".