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Can't we also make a server that is physically hardened against tampering? If servers get small enough and cheap enough and only need to support one individual,

Can't we also make a server that is physically hardened against tampering? If servers get small enough and cheap enough and only need to support one individual, then you can always try encasing that server in some material that is physically difficult to penetrate without risking destruction of the server itself. i.e. encase the server in concrete or opaque resin with a thin lead shielding to prevent x-raying of the device for precise drilling and exposing only the power leads and the network interface. As long as the network software interface is totally secure, you leave no way for any other attacks that I can think of. You could go further and booby trap the enclosure so that it destroys it's contents. At the end of the day, many of these ideas have already been explored in the safe manufacturing industry, such as glass panels that shatter upon drilling, permanently locking the safe. A glass enclosure with a strong liquid corrosive could be used around a small server. Tampering with the outer enclosure could result in likely breakage of that glass vessel, thereby destroying the server beyond recovery.

cdjk 13y ago
It's called a hardware security module (HSM) [1]. The basic idea is to store the private key in the tamper-resistant hardware, along with a microprocessor to perform the basic encryption options you need. They can be relatively cheap, like a smart card + usb smart card reader, to very expensive, like an IBM 4764. Yubikey sells a usb HSM if you want to run your own authentication server for around $500. There's a whole chapter dedicated to HSMs in Security Engineering [2], which is available online. There are clever ways to attack them, and yes, the booby trap idea has been done, typically by using something light-sensitive. I'm not aware of any concrete-encased HSMs, however... It's an interesting topic. That are lots of challenges around them too. It will probably have a battery backup, so how do you allow someone to replace the battery without wiping the keys? Or can only people with access to the keys replace the batteries? That won't work if you're doing mathematical secret sharing, however, since there's no physical way to do that. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module [2] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html
- deleted 13y ago
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- malandrew 13y ago
  Cool info. Upvote. As far as some of the issues you raised like battery replacement, I would treat them as disposable. In the next few years a complete computer will be available for so little that we will consider it disposable. Prepare a server once, enclose it, make sure the only way in or out is an SSH connection. When it's time to set up a clone to replace it, clone everything via an SSH session and trash the first server.
  - cdjk 13y ago
    That could work, but the advantage of an HSM is that the key material is physically prevented from leaving the device, barring acid/x-rays/other attacks. All encryption happens on the device itself. With an open ssh connection you could still remove the key material from computer.

cdjk 13y ago

It's called a hardware security module (HSM) [1]. The basic idea is to store the private key in the tamper-resistant hardware, along with a microprocessor to perform the basic encryption options you need. They can be relatively cheap, like a smart card + usb smart card reader, to very expensive, like an IBM 4764. Yubikey sells a usb HSM if you want to run your own authentication server for around $500. There's a whole chapter dedicated to HSMs in Security Engineering [2], which is available online. There are clever ways to attack them, and yes, the booby trap idea has been done, typically by using something light-sensitive. I'm not aware of any concrete-encased HSMs, however... It's an interesting topic. That are lots of challenges around them too. It will probably have a battery backup, so how do you allow someone to replace the battery without wiping the keys? Or can only people with access to the keys replace the batteries? That won't work if you're doing mathematical secret sharing, however, since there's no physical way to do that. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module [2] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html

deleted 13y ago
[deleted]
malandrew 13y ago
Cool info. Upvote. As far as some of the issues you raised like battery replacement, I would treat them as disposable. In the next few years a complete computer will be available for so little that we will consider it disposable. Prepare a server once, enclose it, make sure the only way in or out is an SSH connection. When it's time to set up a clone to replace it, clone everything via an SSH session and trash the first server.
- cdjk 13y ago
  That could work, but the advantage of an HSM is that the key material is physically prevented from leaving the device, barring acid/x-rays/other attacks. All encryption happens on the device itself. With an open ssh connection you could still remove the key material from computer.