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Any centralized service can be ordered to hand over encrypted material or to implement a backdoor, similar to Lavabit case. Bitmessage could be one possible typ

Any centralized service can be ordered to hand over encrypted material or to implement a backdoor, similar to Lavabit case. Bitmessage could be one possible type of solution. That way the only way to compromise the message (assuming it is as safe as bitcoin, not claiming bitmessage is) would be to compromise the sender or the receiver, both is much more secure than any email service. And they could not make any backdoors, because the code is opensource and changes would be visible. If they would make some of the clients with some kind of backdoor, others, without backdoor, could possibly not accept their messages, so the 51% attack would be vulnerability.

toyg 13y ago
The problem with P2P is that you need "Ps" online at the same time in order to exchange data. One of the elements that allowed for the email revolution was the asynchronous nature of exchanges: I'll send an email now and you'll receive it whenever you're online. Requiring coordination is a non-starter. Personally, as long as the encryption was entirely done client-side with opensource tools, and done properly (i.e. not involving keys stored on the actual server), I wouldn't mind making my messages go through hostile servers. Of course the NSA might be able to dedicate enough resources to break them, but they wouldn't have enough to break everyone's messages at the same time. If global surveillance were only possible with a two/three-year timelapse, that'd be a good enough window in most cases.
- floatboth 13y ago
  Have you read the Bitmessage paper? You can receive a message whenever you're online. The encrypted message is broadcast to a lot of people, at least one of them should be online when you go online.
nwh 13y ago
Bitmessage is not the solution. If you tell me your address (and related public key), it can just be modified on the wire to MITM the communication. There's no getting around that.

toyg 13y ago

The problem with P2P is that you need "Ps" online at the same time in order to exchange data. One of the elements that allowed for the email revolution was the asynchronous nature of exchanges: I'll send an email now and you'll receive it whenever you're online. Requiring coordination is a non-starter. Personally, as long as the encryption was entirely done client-side with opensource tools, and done properly (i.e. not involving keys stored on the actual server), I wouldn't mind making my messages go through hostile servers. Of course the NSA might be able to dedicate enough resources to break them, but they wouldn't have enough to break everyone's messages at the same time. If global surveillance were only possible with a two/three-year timelapse, that'd be a good enough window in most cases.

floatboth 13y ago
Have you read the Bitmessage paper? You can receive a message whenever you're online. The encrypted message is broadcast to a lot of people, at least one of them should be online when you go online.

nwh 13y ago

Bitmessage is not the solution. If you tell me your address (and related public key), it can just be modified on the wire to MITM the communication. There's no getting around that.