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...Can PJ not figure out GnuPG? Is she officially retiring from any and all digital correspondence contrary to her notice that "[her] email [addresses] still wo

...Can PJ not figure out GnuPG? Is she officially retiring from any and all digital correspondence contrary to her notice that "[her] email [addresses] still work"? She says she's getting off the internet to whatever extent possible, and then asks people to continue to send her mail. I also find it cute that people believe facilities based in other Western nations are outside of the NSA's reach. I gotta say that stopping Groklaw, which is a public site anyway, because someone else might be reading it, doesn't seem to make a lot of sense, despite the emotional ploys in this article. She can write and save drafts locally in a (GASP) local word processor and encrypt anything she chooses to upload to remote storage. The government will then not be able to read unfinished Groklaw articles. Does this resolve the issue? This whole article should've just been a public key and a PO box address with this note: "I will not acknowledge plaintext mail. If you are uncomfortable transmitting encrypted data over the wire, please send a USB disk to this box."

FedRegister 13y ago
>Can PJ not figure out GnuPG? I'm sure she can, but by doing so has reduced the set of people capable of sending her mail significantly by imposing the requirement that they figure out GnuPG before they send her an email.
- xradionut 13y ago
  If you want to use it, you can figure it out. It requires more work than most people care about.
  - FedRegister 13y ago
    Not in the same way that you can use email though. It is unsafe to use GnuPG on a computer you do not own or trust like a computer at a public library or an Internet cafe. It is, however, possible to register an email address on such a computer and send unencrypted email on that same computer with some precautions and still be fairly sure that the contents will not be connected to you.
    - cookiecaper 13y ago
      It's just as safe to use GnuPG on a public terminal as it is to use any other password-protected functionality on a public terminal. You run the risk that the terminal is recording your input and that your password may be compromised. In one case, this may compromise the security of your private key, and in the other case, it may compromise the security of your email account. One could argue that GnuPG is actually safer on a public terminal than generic online email access, because if you keep your keys on a USB stick, it's another critical piece of data that would have to get collected separately before the captured input data was of any use (this could be automated, but it'd be much harder than just running a keylogger, especially if one undertakes avoidance techniques). If one accesses an ordinary email service, the log would look like "gmail.com↲cookiecaper↲mypassword", which obviously contains all information necessary to access an account. As long as the private key is not automatically copied by the terminal, you can simply change your passphrase after each usage of a public terminal and it simply won't matter if someone stole your input or not. The only issue is that in the real world, most terminals do not have GnuPG installed. We should be using taking this opportunity to try to change that, while public interest is on the topic.
      - FedRegister 13y ago
        The main point I was trying to make is that, if you don't own a computer of your own and you are trying to leak something, an internet cafe or other public terminal that sees use by several people might be an effective way of hiding that you sent something. If you don't own a computer of your own you have no trusted place you can go to generate a PGP key, to set its passphrase securely, to encrypt email before you use the public terminal, to decrypt what you retrieved from the public terminal on your home machine (so your passphrase can't be keylogged or your key cannot be copied), and so forth. If you use a mass-market operating system (Windows, Mac OS X) you might have a computer that you own but cannot trust in any way. That's where opening a "throwaway" email address and sending something unencrypted is a viable use case. If you muck it up by trying to encrypt using PGP then possession of the key is persuasive (but not conclusive) evidence that you are the one that sent the email, and quickly becomes conclusive evidence if even the most basic automated surveillance techniques are used on that untrusted machine. >One could argue that GnuPG is actually safer on a public terminal than generic online email access, because if you keep your keys on a USB stick, it's another critical piece of data that would have to get collected separately before the captured input data was of any use (this could be automated, but it'd be much harder than just running a keylogger, especially if one undertakes avoidance techniques). One would be wrong. If an adversary is keeping a copy of every file that is opened on a USB stick (which would be trivial to add as an "update", "patch", or "option" to, say, an on-demand antivirus scanner) then it's game over. >If one accesses an ordinary email service, the log would look like "gmail.com↲cookiecaper↲mypassword", which obviously contains all information necessary to access an account. As long as the private key is not automatically copied by the terminal, you can simply change your passphrase after each usage of a public terminal and it simply won't matter if someone stole your input or not. If they have your key from the previous step then changing your passphrase does absolutely "jack" and "shit". Where are you going to change this passphrase anyway that's on a computer owned/trusted by you if you don't own a computer or don't want to tie that key back to your home machine and identity? >The only issue is that in the real world, most terminals do not have GnuPG installed. We should be using taking this opportunity to try to change that, while public interest is on the topic. Then you'll have backdoored copies of GnuPG installed on these machines that will offer you no security.
augustl 13y ago
Encryption is mentioned in the article, but dismissed as encrypted e-mails are stored for 5 years in hope of new discoveries for decrypting without the private key. I still agree with you, though.. PGP is pretty good, after all :)
angersock 13y ago
She makes the observation that any encrypted email is held on to for ~5 years--this may be why she didn't want to bother with the GPG bollocks.
- cookiecaper 13y ago
  The thing is, GPG is not bollocks. Barring a major unforeseen discovery, RSA cryptography will easily stand up to five years' retention. If you're worried, use a long keylength. I've been using 4096-bit keys for over a year now and there's no noticeable performance hit for regular comms on my computer. On my phone, 4096 is noticeably slower than 2048, but it still works fine (probably about a 5-10 sec operation to decrypt an ordinary email, and I have a comparatively "old" phone).
  - shimonamit 13y ago
    The longest key in the world won't protect you from a FISA warrent.
    - cookiecaper 13y ago
      What. A FISA warrant doesn't magically render RSA invalid. If all your comms are encrypted, they can get whatever warrants they want, and they still won't be able to read your information unless you surrender your passphrase and key.
      - jcromartie 13y ago
        They can, and do, force you to divulge your key.
        cookiecaper 13y ago
        I understand that they can, and sometimes may, force you to divulge your key, but it's not a consistent thing in the United States. There are judgments that require the divulgence, and judgments that claim such forced divulgence is precluded by the Fifth Amendment. In any case, you buy yourself a very large amount of time if you don't just leave all your communiques out for them to read in plaintext. If you're encrypted, you have a lot of due process to exhaust before they ultimatley MAY order you to divulge the key. They have to go through your lawyer. He can file motions and appeals. The accused may incidentally forget the password. There are a lot of options. With plaintext, there are no options; there is only the government with all your content, and you with no control over anything. See this here, with reference to the conflicting case law in the U.S.: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law#United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law#United_Stat...
nemik 13y ago
GnuPG is not a solution for this. The problem is not just about the contents of the message, but knowing your communication habits. GnuPG can't encrypt who your message is going to, being replied to, when, or even the subject. The NSA probably isn't storing all the contents of voice calls either, but it really doesn't matter all that much. They can still tell who you communicate with when and how often. That's not conducive to democracy or free speech. Furthermore, because of how few people use GnuPG or other such tools, I would expect you'd only be targeted harder for using them.
- cookiecaper 13y ago
  > GnuPG is not a solution for this. The problem is not just about the contents of the message, but knowing your communication habits. GnuPG can't encrypt who your message is going to, being replied to, when, or even the subject. GnuPG is PART of a solution to this. If you do need to hide the recipient, sender, subject line, etc., then you'll have to bolster your solution with other offerings. One suggestion may be to use temporary email addresses created through Tor, so that the gathered mail header data is not meaningful. Another suggestion would be to encrypt the data and dump it onto a filehost and send the link through a non-email channel. But in any case, it is crucial that the content of one's messages remains private. >Furthermore, because of how few people use GnuPG or other such tools, I would expect you'd only be targeted harder for using them. Indeed this is the case now, but as we get more people set up with GPG, it will no longer be an effective method of discrimination.
pixie_ 13y ago
I think she just wants to take a break (maybe even subconsciously) and this is the excuse she can use to do it.

FedRegister 13y ago

>Can PJ not figure out GnuPG? I'm sure she can, but by doing so has reduced the set of people capable of sending her mail significantly by imposing the requirement that they figure out GnuPG before they send her an email.

xradionut 13y ago
If you want to use it, you can figure it out. It requires more work than most people care about.
- FedRegister 13y ago
  Not in the same way that you can use email though. It is unsafe to use GnuPG on a computer you do not own or trust like a computer at a public library or an Internet cafe. It is, however, possible to register an email address on such a computer and send unencrypted email on that same computer with some precautions and still be fairly sure that the contents will not be connected to you.
  - cookiecaper 13y ago
    It's just as safe to use GnuPG on a public terminal as it is to use any other password-protected functionality on a public terminal. You run the risk that the terminal is recording your input and that your password may be compromised. In one case, this may compromise the security of your private key, and in the other case, it may compromise the security of your email account. One could argue that GnuPG is actually safer on a public terminal than generic online email access, because if you keep your keys on a USB stick, it's another critical piece of data that would have to get collected separately before the captured input data was of any use (this could be automated, but it'd be much harder than just running a keylogger, especially if one undertakes avoidance techniques). If one accesses an ordinary email service, the log would look like "gmail.com↲cookiecaper↲mypassword", which obviously contains all information necessary to access an account. As long as the private key is not automatically copied by the terminal, you can simply change your passphrase after each usage of a public terminal and it simply won't matter if someone stole your input or not. The only issue is that in the real world, most terminals do not have GnuPG installed. We should be using taking this opportunity to try to change that, while public interest is on the topic.
    - FedRegister 13y ago
      The main point I was trying to make is that, if you don't own a computer of your own and you are trying to leak something, an internet cafe or other public terminal that sees use by several people might be an effective way of hiding that you sent something. If you don't own a computer of your own you have no trusted place you can go to generate a PGP key, to set its passphrase securely, to encrypt email before you use the public terminal, to decrypt what you retrieved from the public terminal on your home machine (so your passphrase can't be keylogged or your key cannot be copied), and so forth. If you use a mass-market operating system (Windows, Mac OS X) you might have a computer that you own but cannot trust in any way. That's where opening a "throwaway" email address and sending something unencrypted is a viable use case. If you muck it up by trying to encrypt using PGP then possession of the key is persuasive (but not conclusive) evidence that you are the one that sent the email, and quickly becomes conclusive evidence if even the most basic automated surveillance techniques are used on that untrusted machine. >One could argue that GnuPG is actually safer on a public terminal than generic online email access, because if you keep your keys on a USB stick, it's another critical piece of data that would have to get collected separately before the captured input data was of any use (this could be automated, but it'd be much harder than just running a keylogger, especially if one undertakes avoidance techniques). One would be wrong. If an adversary is keeping a copy of every file that is opened on a USB stick (which would be trivial to add as an "update", "patch", or "option" to, say, an on-demand antivirus scanner) then it's game over. >If one accesses an ordinary email service, the log would look like "gmail.com↲cookiecaper↲mypassword", which obviously contains all information necessary to access an account. As long as the private key is not automatically copied by the terminal, you can simply change your passphrase after each usage of a public terminal and it simply won't matter if someone stole your input or not. If they have your key from the previous step then changing your passphrase does absolutely "jack" and "shit". Where are you going to change this passphrase anyway that's on a computer owned/trusted by you if you don't own a computer or don't want to tie that key back to your home machine and identity? >The only issue is that in the real world, most terminals do not have GnuPG installed. We should be using taking this opportunity to try to change that, while public interest is on the topic. Then you'll have backdoored copies of GnuPG installed on these machines that will offer you no security.

augustl 13y ago

Encryption is mentioned in the article, but dismissed as encrypted e-mails are stored for 5 years in hope of new discoveries for decrypting without the private key. I still agree with you, though.. PGP is pretty good, after all :)

angersock 13y ago

She makes the observation that any encrypted email is held on to for ~5 years--this may be why she didn't want to bother with the GPG bollocks.

cookiecaper 13y ago
The thing is, GPG is not bollocks. Barring a major unforeseen discovery, RSA cryptography will easily stand up to five years' retention. If you're worried, use a long keylength. I've been using 4096-bit keys for over a year now and there's no noticeable performance hit for regular comms on my computer. On my phone, 4096 is noticeably slower than 2048, but it still works fine (probably about a 5-10 sec operation to decrypt an ordinary email, and I have a comparatively "old" phone).
- shimonamit 13y ago
  The longest key in the world won't protect you from a FISA warrent.
  - cookiecaper 13y ago
    What. A FISA warrant doesn't magically render RSA invalid. If all your comms are encrypted, they can get whatever warrants they want, and they still won't be able to read your information unless you surrender your passphrase and key.
    - jcromartie 13y ago
      They can, and do, force you to divulge your key.
      - cookiecaper 13y ago
        I understand that they can, and sometimes may, force you to divulge your key, but it's not a consistent thing in the United States. There are judgments that require the divulgence, and judgments that claim such forced divulgence is precluded by the Fifth Amendment. In any case, you buy yourself a very large amount of time if you don't just leave all your communiques out for them to read in plaintext. If you're encrypted, you have a lot of due process to exhaust before they ultimatley MAY order you to divulge the key. They have to go through your lawyer. He can file motions and appeals. The accused may incidentally forget the password. There are a lot of options. With plaintext, there are no options; there is only the government with all your content, and you with no control over anything. See this here, with reference to the conflicting case law in the U.S.: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law#United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law#United_Stat...

nemik 13y ago

GnuPG is not a solution for this. The problem is not just about the contents of the message, but knowing your communication habits. GnuPG can't encrypt who your message is going to, being replied to, when, or even the subject. The NSA probably isn't storing all the contents of voice calls either, but it really doesn't matter all that much. They can still tell who you communicate with when and how often. That's not conducive to democracy or free speech. Furthermore, because of how few people use GnuPG or other such tools, I would expect you'd only be targeted harder for using them.

cookiecaper 13y ago
> GnuPG is not a solution for this. The problem is not just about the contents of the message, but knowing your communication habits. GnuPG can't encrypt who your message is going to, being replied to, when, or even the subject. GnuPG is PART of a solution to this. If you do need to hide the recipient, sender, subject line, etc., then you'll have to bolster your solution with other offerings. One suggestion may be to use temporary email addresses created through Tor, so that the gathered mail header data is not meaningful. Another suggestion would be to encrypt the data and dump it onto a filehost and send the link through a non-email channel. But in any case, it is crucial that the content of one's messages remains private. >Furthermore, because of how few people use GnuPG or other such tools, I would expect you'd only be targeted harder for using them. Indeed this is the case now, but as we get more people set up with GPG, it will no longer be an effective method of discrimination.

pixie_ 13y ago

I think she just wants to take a break (maybe even subconsciously) and this is the excuse she can use to do it.