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I wouldn't imagine that. All we really know about the NSA's cryptographic powers are that they have a shit-ton of money and a lot of very smart people. And even
by wpietri 13y ago
I wouldn't imagine that. All we really know about the NSA's cryptographic powers are that they have a shit-ton of money and a lot of very smart people. And even if your cryptography is actually as secure as you think, the power that can be brought to bear here is immense.
Could they, from a distance, read the EM emissions of your computer? Could they compromise some physical object on which you set your computer and read the EM emissions from there? Can you afford to have somebody watching your computer every second of the day? Is there some possible attack that you haven't thought of but they, having devoted lifetimes of thought to the problem, have?
Of course, they could also be bumbling idiots, so there may be no need to worry. Certainly, this sort of ham-fisted pressure suggests that there are, at least, idiots involved. But if you have gotten to the sort of prominence where somebody might be willing to burn a billion dollars to cause you trouble, it's really hard to say what's safe and what isn't.
- marcuspovey 13y agoNo need: Using a Mac? Compromised, the NSA has root access via the Patriot act. Ditto windows. And that's before you get to the idea of remote updates to the microcode supported by modern PCs (and not even running Linux keeps you safe from that, unless you recompile your kernel to turn it off). Lets also not forget that even the strongest crypto is vulnerable to cartel attacks and the rubber hose technique.
- dTal 13y agoUse a one-time pad, run Linux, don't connect to the net a machine with access to the keys or the plaintext. Encrypt your message, copy the file to a formatted flash drive, and send it to your communication partner however you like. Hell, stick it on pastebin, it won't matter. I'm confused at the perspective being espoused here - "encryption is pointless because the NSA can break anything, and failing that they can always beat you up". Encryption is not pointless, they probably can't even break standard open source crypto, they definitely can't break one-time pads which are trivially easy to make nowadays, and they can always beat you up anyway so you might as well encrypt. There's no plausible way any of that is less safe than running the gauntlet of border security with the data in your pocket.
- wpietri 13y agoI think you've exaggerated the perspective being espoused, so your reply is equally exaggerated. Encryption only solves the problem of a suspicious link with perfectly trustworthy endpoints and a perfectly trustworthy side channel (for keys). Nobody is saying, "don't encrypt." But people are saying, "don't assume encryption is perfectly safe." Also, the plausible way that physical carriage is safer is that you know when interception happens. If you encrypt everything and then use your husband's pocket as a transport medium rather than a wire, that's better data security because interception is harder, and can't be done in secret.
- cheald 13y agoIf you can exchange a one time pad out of band via a secure channel (say, face-to-face) then you have absolutely unbreakable encryption, no matter how good the attackers are. This doesn't stop side-channel attacks, but it invalidates and questions about the strength of the encryption algorithm. One can only hope that Greenwald et al have been clued into this.