12 ms·

What Exactly Did The US Government Ask Lavabit to Do?

161 points by m8urn 13y ago

deleted 13y ago
[deleted]
frank_boyd 13y ago
As long as we don't have a statement from either the government or Lavabit, we can only speculate. The most reasonable thing is then of course to assume the worst - complete surveillance of all customers. The rest is pretty much details.
- coldcode 13y ago
  Until we get someone to risk going open with this we won't ever know. You can't fight a secret law in secret very well. But only people served with a secret demand has standing to challenge it. The barriers are too high as long as the Government can keep the secret. Once it's out of the bag you have more options in court. But you also risk everything they can do to you in secret. Secrets have no place in a "democracy".
callesgg 13y ago
This article gives no new information, it is stupid. Now i will speculate: As long as he does not know his customers passwords he can't retroactively view the customers mails, once the mails have been encrypted and the plain-text thrown away the stuff is unreachable. So the US gov probably wanted him to save his customers passwords when they logged in.
- m8urn 13y ago
  Right and the important point being that this isn't just about sniffing his network, it is the most invasive surveillance possible that would make his whole business a lie. The point of the article was to go through the logic to show that this would have been the only possibility for what they requested him to do.
kordless 13y ago
A device or piece of software designed to sniff the mail server to mail server connections would also be an option for broad based surveillance. Only a handful of mail providers (like Google) have the option to encrypt traffic server to server. Most mail servers transmit messages in the clear to each other and only encrypt the server to client side.
- m8urn 13y ago
  Perhaps only a handful such as Google will use SSL but Google is a HUGE percentage of email.
  - chris_mahan 13y ago
    I completely assume that Google will turn over your entire email history to the US government whenever they ask, and without telling you, then or later.
- zokier 13y ago
  > Only a handful of mail providers (like Google) have the option to encrypt traffic server to server. SSL/TLS is available for everyone. > Most mail servers transmit messages in the clear to each other and only encrypt the server to client side. I hear this again and again, but I can't really find any data that confirms this claim one way or another. Anyone on HN running their own mailserver wanting to comment on how large portion of connections get encrypted?
  - danrik 13y ago
    The entire email transation between a sender and a recipient usually looks like this: Sending Client [--A---> Sender SMTP Server [--B---> Recipient SMTP Server [--C--> Recipient IMAP/POP server <---D----] Recipient Client Connections A and D are easily possible to encrypt, provided your provider provides SSL/TLS on their SMTP and IMAP/POP servers. Most usually do. Connection C is usually local to a single machine, or for large email providers will go over an intranet of some kind. What is at issue is connection B, which goes over the public internet. That is almost always in clear text, as most of this infrastructure was designed 30 years ago and hasn't evolved much since then. If you are sending email within a single provider (e.g. sender@gmail.com to recipient@gmail.com), such delivery can be trivially encrypted.
sudocw 13y ago
Are there currently any alternatives, in terms of secure email providers? I never even knew it was a thing before the lavabit fiasco.
- backprojection 13y ago
  Could you trust any that remain operating, after the Lavabit fiasco?
  - m8urn 13y ago
    One clue is a statement Levison made is that it's not just what they asked him to do, it's also what he knows that would change our perspective of email: “If you knew what I know about e-mail, you might not use it either.”
  - karon 13y ago
    Many people seem to forget that there are still countries where US laws are not in effect. Even more interesting is the fact that even Lavabit's founder seemed to have overlooked this fact, and instead of relocating his servers and all the user data to Iceland, Norway or New Zealand, he chose to shut it down for good. Why?
    - zokier 13y ago
      Because if he got a NSL requesting a backdoor on his servers, then it doesn't matter where the servers are located. What matters where he personally and his company are located. And you can ask Snowden how fun it is to be persona non grata.
    - mcintyre1994 13y ago
      Perhaps we had family, friends and his entire life in America, and didn't want to uproot it all to move his service overseas?
  - mpyne 13y ago
    It simply depends on who is in your threat model.
mankyd 13y ago
This article seems to speculate on things that are not necessarily true. It's possible that the government simply told him that he had to be able to supply information arbitrarily on demand without an explicit warrant. This does not mean that they required him to install their own software on his machines. Of course, one certainly still argue that this a line that the Government should not cross - I'd wholeheartedly agree with that. However, statements such as “We’ve had a couple of dozen court orders served to us over the past 10 years, but they’ve never crossed the line,” do not imply that the government required him to install software or otherwise compromise his security in a way that he was not already able to do.
- m8urn 13y ago
  That's actually the whole point, in the past he complied with warrants because there wasn't much he could supply in the first place. Yes there is a lot of reading between the lines here, but there was a clear line they crossed. In other words, he would no longer be able to just turn over a bunch of encrypted emails, this was a full compromise of the security he had in place. If you look at the quotes he made, he strongly hints that this affects all his users, that they want to collect data for later review, and that they would have the ability to decrypt any emails they wanted. Yes, there is a lot of speculation going on here, but it is based on facts--what they technically would be able to do based on how Lavabit worked. Edit: this wasn't just some casual speculation, I did quite a bit of research on this and carefully reviewed every statement he has given to the press. I carefully analyzed their infrastructure and encryption techniques. I'm fairly confident with my conclusions.
  - mankyd 13y ago
    What I don't see is these three statements: 1. Force Lavabit to provide their private SSL keys and route all their traffic through a government machine that performed a man-in-the-middle style data collection; 2. Change their software to subvert Lavabit’s own security measures and log emails after SSL decryption but before encrypting with the users’ public keys; or 3. Require Lavabit to install malicious code to infect their own customers with government-supplied malware. It sounds like he already has the ability to comply with demands for information. I don't see where this new stipulation by them requires any meaningful change to his existing infrastructure.
jauer 13y ago
So long as uninformed speculation is running loose... Lavabit's comment that "If you knew what I know about e-mail, you might not use it either." points in a email specific direction as opposed to simple sniffing of traffic. Perhaps he is referring to the Stored Communications Act ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stored_Communications_Act http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stored_Communications_Act ). I haven't seen it referenced in coverage of this but the gist is under the right circumstances email that is older than six months and stored on a server that you don't own can be accessed without a warrant. Lavabit's encryption process as described would interfere with that. Not being able to comply AND being unwilling to take steps to comply in the future is the sort of thing that feds don't like. This wasn't a big deal when it was passed in 1986 and small mail quotas were the norm but now with IMAP, multiple devices, and archiving it becomes a pretty big issue as you are talking about someone's electronic life instead of abandoned mailboxes. AFAIK the issue of Fourth Amendment issues and SCA hasn't made it to the Supreme Court yet so interpretations vary depending on circuit.
- m8urn 13y ago
  Levison did make a comment once that he couldn't give the government what he didn't have, referring to deleted emails. I didn't address that in the article but it is another dimension to this. Being that this is all about something he didn't already have, chances are that archived messages was one of those things. Nevertheless, the means to decrypt those messages still is the critical difference here.
- Buttons840 13y ago
  Had it been because of the Stored Communications Act, would that explain why he couldn't talk about it?
  - tankbot 13y ago
    Someone else can probably answer this more accurately, but I don't see that these two things are related. That is, they may have referenced the Stored Communications Act when requesting the information, but that is not what puts a gag on Lavabit.
  - 13y ago
radley 13y ago
It seems pretty clear to me (Occam's razor): 1) he was told he had to use the same monitoring process all the other providers were using 2) as a state secret, he couldn't reveal he was doing it ever to his users 3) if he complied he would totally undermine the nature of his service Anything else is superfluous.
martin_ 13y ago
"In reality all it would take is a few lines of code code to log the user’s original password which allows you to decrypt the private key which in turn allows you to receive and send mail as that user as well as access any stored messages." Is this any different to writing a few lines of code to sniff the PreMasterSecret or even just a plain ol' MitM attack?
dangero 13y ago
Hypothetical question: What if the founder of Lavabit took the documents that the US government sent him and gagged him with and put them somewhere where they could be stolen or illegally accessed? For example, what if he put them on a computer with a public facing ip address, or even left them on his desk in his office? If he could have plausible deniability couldn't they get stolen and leaked without him really getting in trouble? This may seem like a stretch, but when you consider the government is using secret interpretations of laws how is it any different than what they are doing?
- FedRegister 13y ago
  >This may seem like a stretch, but when you consider the government is using secret interpretations of laws how is it any different than what they are doing? The difference is that they have the guns, the tanks, and the full weight of the Department of Justice behind them.
justanother 13y ago
Kickstarter idea: $xxx,xxx for the network operator who sniffs network traffic that discloses the basis for the Secret TSA ID law. Goose, gander, etc. I'd happily kick in 1%.
- nwh 13y ago
  Accepting the money would be a death sentence, essentially. Nobody would do it.

161 points by m8urn 13y ago

deleted 13y ago

[deleted]

As long as we don't have a statement from either the government or Lavabit, we can only speculate. The most reasonable thing is then of course to assume the worst - complete surveillance of all customers. The rest is pretty much details.

coldcode 13y ago
Until we get someone to risk going open with this we won't ever know. You can't fight a secret law in secret very well. But only people served with a secret demand has standing to challenge it. The barriers are too high as long as the Government can keep the secret. Once it's out of the bag you have more options in court. But you also risk everything they can do to you in secret. Secrets have no place in a "democracy".

callesgg 13y ago

This article gives no new information, it is stupid. Now i will speculate: As long as he does not know his customers passwords he can't retroactively view the customers mails, once the mails have been encrypted and the plain-text thrown away the stuff is unreachable. So the US gov probably wanted him to save his customers passwords when they logged in.

m8urn 13y ago
Right and the important point being that this isn't just about sniffing his network, it is the most invasive surveillance possible that would make his whole business a lie. The point of the article was to go through the logic to show that this would have been the only possibility for what they requested him to do.

kordless 13y ago

A device or piece of software designed to sniff the mail server to mail server connections would also be an option for broad based surveillance. Only a handful of mail providers (like Google) have the option to encrypt traffic server to server. Most mail servers transmit messages in the clear to each other and only encrypt the server to client side.

m8urn 13y ago
Perhaps only a handful such as Google will use SSL but Google is a HUGE percentage of email.
- chris_mahan 13y ago
  I completely assume that Google will turn over your entire email history to the US government whenever they ask, and without telling you, then or later.
zokier 13y ago
> Only a handful of mail providers (like Google) have the option to encrypt traffic server to server. SSL/TLS is available for everyone. > Most mail servers transmit messages in the clear to each other and only encrypt the server to client side. I hear this again and again, but I can't really find any data that confirms this claim one way or another. Anyone on HN running their own mailserver wanting to comment on how large portion of connections get encrypted?
- danrik 13y ago
  The entire email transation between a sender and a recipient usually looks like this: Sending Client [--A---> Sender SMTP Server [--B---> Recipient SMTP Server [--C--> Recipient IMAP/POP server <---D----] Recipient Client Connections A and D are easily possible to encrypt, provided your provider provides SSL/TLS on their SMTP and IMAP/POP servers. Most usually do. Connection C is usually local to a single machine, or for large email providers will go over an intranet of some kind. What is at issue is connection B, which goes over the public internet. That is almost always in clear text, as most of this infrastructure was designed 30 years ago and hasn't evolved much since then. If you are sending email within a single provider (e.g. sender@gmail.com to recipient@gmail.com), such delivery can be trivially encrypted.

sudocw 13y ago

Are there currently any alternatives, in terms of secure email providers? I never even knew it was a thing before the lavabit fiasco.

backprojection 13y ago
Could you trust any that remain operating, after the Lavabit fiasco?
- m8urn 13y ago
  One clue is a statement Levison made is that it's not just what they asked him to do, it's also what he knows that would change our perspective of email: “If you knew what I know about e-mail, you might not use it either.”
- karon 13y ago
  Many people seem to forget that there are still countries where US laws are not in effect. Even more interesting is the fact that even Lavabit's founder seemed to have overlooked this fact, and instead of relocating his servers and all the user data to Iceland, Norway or New Zealand, he chose to shut it down for good. Why?
  - zokier 13y ago
    Because if he got a NSL requesting a backdoor on his servers, then it doesn't matter where the servers are located. What matters where he personally and his company are located. And you can ask Snowden how fun it is to be persona non grata.
  - mcintyre1994 13y ago
    Perhaps we had family, friends and his entire life in America, and didn't want to uproot it all to move his service overseas?
- mpyne 13y ago
  It simply depends on who is in your threat model.

mankyd 13y ago

This article seems to speculate on things that are not necessarily true. It's possible that the government simply told him that he had to be able to supply information arbitrarily on demand without an explicit warrant. This does not mean that they required him to install their own software on his machines. Of course, one certainly still argue that this a line that the Government should not cross - I'd wholeheartedly agree with that. However, statements such as “We’ve had a couple of dozen court orders served to us over the past 10 years, but they’ve never crossed the line,” do not imply that the government required him to install software or otherwise compromise his security in a way that he was not already able to do.

m8urn 13y ago
That's actually the whole point, in the past he complied with warrants because there wasn't much he could supply in the first place. Yes there is a lot of reading between the lines here, but there was a clear line they crossed. In other words, he would no longer be able to just turn over a bunch of encrypted emails, this was a full compromise of the security he had in place. If you look at the quotes he made, he strongly hints that this affects all his users, that they want to collect data for later review, and that they would have the ability to decrypt any emails they wanted. Yes, there is a lot of speculation going on here, but it is based on facts--what they technically would be able to do based on how Lavabit worked. Edit: this wasn't just some casual speculation, I did quite a bit of research on this and carefully reviewed every statement he has given to the press. I carefully analyzed their infrastructure and encryption techniques. I'm fairly confident with my conclusions.
- mankyd 13y ago
  What I don't see is these three statements: 1. Force Lavabit to provide their private SSL keys and route all their traffic through a government machine that performed a man-in-the-middle style data collection; 2. Change their software to subvert Lavabit’s own security measures and log emails after SSL decryption but before encrypting with the users’ public keys; or 3. Require Lavabit to install malicious code to infect their own customers with government-supplied malware. It sounds like he already has the ability to comply with demands for information. I don't see where this new stipulation by them requires any meaningful change to his existing infrastructure.

jauer 13y ago

So long as uninformed speculation is running loose... Lavabit's comment that "If you knew what I know about e-mail, you might not use it either." points in a email specific direction as opposed to simple sniffing of traffic. Perhaps he is referring to the Stored Communications Act ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stored_Communications_Act http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stored_Communications_Act ). I haven't seen it referenced in coverage of this but the gist is under the right circumstances email that is older than six months and stored on a server that you don't own can be accessed without a warrant. Lavabit's encryption process as described would interfere with that. Not being able to comply AND being unwilling to take steps to comply in the future is the sort of thing that feds don't like. This wasn't a big deal when it was passed in 1986 and small mail quotas were the norm but now with IMAP, multiple devices, and archiving it becomes a pretty big issue as you are talking about someone's electronic life instead of abandoned mailboxes. AFAIK the issue of Fourth Amendment issues and SCA hasn't made it to the Supreme Court yet so interpretations vary depending on circuit.

m8urn 13y ago
Levison did make a comment once that he couldn't give the government what he didn't have, referring to deleted emails. I didn't address that in the article but it is another dimension to this. Being that this is all about something he didn't already have, chances are that archived messages was one of those things. Nevertheless, the means to decrypt those messages still is the critical difference here.
Buttons840 13y ago
Had it been because of the Stored Communications Act, would that explain why he couldn't talk about it?
- tankbot 13y ago
  Someone else can probably answer this more accurately, but I don't see that these two things are related. That is, they may have referenced the Stored Communications Act when requesting the information, but that is not what puts a gag on Lavabit.
- 13y ago

radley 13y ago

It seems pretty clear to me (Occam's razor): 1) he was told he had to use the same monitoring process all the other providers were using 2) as a state secret, he couldn't reveal he was doing it ever to his users 3) if he complied he would totally undermine the nature of his service Anything else is superfluous.

martin_ 13y ago

"In reality all it would take is a few lines of code code to log the user’s original password which allows you to decrypt the private key which in turn allows you to receive and send mail as that user as well as access any stored messages." Is this any different to writing a few lines of code to sniff the PreMasterSecret or even just a plain ol' MitM attack?

dangero 13y ago

Hypothetical question: What if the founder of Lavabit took the documents that the US government sent him and gagged him with and put them somewhere where they could be stolen or illegally accessed? For example, what if he put them on a computer with a public facing ip address, or even left them on his desk in his office? If he could have plausible deniability couldn't they get stolen and leaked without him really getting in trouble? This may seem like a stretch, but when you consider the government is using secret interpretations of laws how is it any different than what they are doing?

FedRegister 13y ago
>This may seem like a stretch, but when you consider the government is using secret interpretations of laws how is it any different than what they are doing? The difference is that they have the guns, the tanks, and the full weight of the Department of Justice behind them.

justanother 13y ago

Kickstarter idea: $xxx,xxx for the network operator who sniffs network traffic that discloses the basis for the Secret TSA ID law. Goose, gander, etc. I'd happily kick in 1%.

nwh 13y ago
Accepting the money would be a death sentence, essentially. Nobody would do it.