3 ms·
The EULA of Safari specifically disclaims warranties and fitness-for-purpose to the limits of law (section 7). Further, it would be pretty hard to get damages
by jacques_chester 13y ago
The EULA of Safari specifically disclaims warranties and fitness-for-purpose to the limits of law (section 7).
Further, it would be pretty hard to get damages when no money has changed hands and actual economic loss is basically impossible to calculate.
Meanwhile, the presence of the door lock, even if faulty, clearly signals your intention that nobody enter without permission. Even a rope across a driveway can signal an unwillingness to receive visitors; anyone who gets past it is a trespasser, committing a civil wrong and probably a crime.
That's roughly analogous to Google's position: sure the mechanism had a bug. But the intention of the mechanism is pretty obvious and arguing that unless a lock is perfect you can do as you please with other people's property isn't going to be a very scalable law.
TINLA, IANAL.
- cromwellian 13y agoBut I don't think the intent of the lock in this case is to make federated services impossible to use properly. Clearly, the purpose of the lock in this case was to prevent third party tracking cookies. The problem is, there's no technological way to segment cookies used for authentication from cookies used for tracking in this way. The Web has an authentication problem. Existing solutions have tried to work around it by leveraging browser features not originally designed for the purpose. The result is privacy snafus like this. Google, Facebook, et al, would argue that they have platforms, and networks of sites, with a real need for this functionality, whose basic goal is not to invade privacy, but to improve enduser UX when using their services.
- jacques_chester 13y agoThat it is inconvenient not to abuse a bug is not an argument in its favour. It might be inconvenient not to trespass. Too bad, it's still trespass. I agree with the problem of authentication; I actually have a patent application in covering a solution to a tangential authentication problem. I tried for several years to do it all with cookies and javascript; my eventual conclusion was that it can't really be done securely. So the generalised design I submitted depends on piggybacking on extensible command channels -- HTTP headers, in this particular case.