Thanks for your efforts. Others are working on similar projects. I'm not sure whether this applies to liamzebedee's concepts (haven't read enough yet) but may

Thanks for your efforts. Others are working on similar projects. I'm not sure whether this applies to liamzebedee's concepts (haven't read enough yet) but may apply to the trsst scheme: I just want to point out that there are really three problems to be solved: (a) prevent unintended parties from reading messages - this is handled as well as can be (as far as we know in the present state of things) by strong encryption. It also requires avoidance of reliance on third parties such as CAs. (b) correct identification of intended interlocutors - I believe the CA system, and any central-"authority" system, are worse than useless for this. The only alternative that has a realistic chance at the objectives is a "web of trust" based on side channels, individual judgments about who's who and who's controlling their own keys correctly, and watching keys and behavior of parties for consistency over time. (c) obscuring who's talking to whom. If Alice publishes something on trsst, encrypted for Bob, it may be unreadable by anyone but Bob (assuming 'a' and 'b' are sound) - but if the adversary Nancy has extensive, sophisticated powers throughout the network, then Nancy may be able to track the posting of the message to Alice and the reading of the message to Bob. Then Nancy can track them down and coerce their secret keys, trojan their PCs, or "disappear" them (not in USA, you say? wait for it). If I'm reading this correctly it handles (a) and (b) to some degree but I'm not sure it addresses (c).