That's an interesting line of thought. I also share the opinion that preference, aesthetic or otherwise, is intimately related to ethics. "There are, of course

That's an interesting line of thought. I also share the opinion that preference, aesthetic or otherwise, is intimately related to ethics. "There are, of course, lots of arguments for or against torture or peanut butter, but they aren't moral propositions. For peanut butter, they might be about health; for torture, they might be about what's legal, or what works to stop terrorism." That's quite an assertion. It borders on Nihilism. You imply that there is no different between preference & what we see as morals. I don't think you're free and clear though. There are all sorts of ways to draw a distinction between the two. From a utilitarian perspective, you could argue that torturing causes pain & is therefore bad. From a rights/liberty perspective, you could argue that it violates some ones rights or liberties. Form the Kantian/Deontological or many other perspectives, you'd see that you would not want torture to be widespread or that it is inherently wrong. Basically, almost to the extent that morality can be said to exist, torture can be said to be wrong. Peanut butter eating can be said to be right. Hobbit houses are quite clearly in the peanut butter category. In a more practical sense, you just answer the question about whether you should coerce or encourage others to eat peanut butter, stop torturing or build hobbit houses for any reason other then that they will enjoy it.