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I think Colin's bang on here. Now is the time for cryptographers and software developers to act to implement a mature alternative to RSA, but it's not the point
by iuguy 13y ago
I think Colin's bang on here. Now is the time for cryptographers and software developers to act to implement a mature alternative to RSA, but it's not the point for your average joe to switch to an as yet relatively untested/unproven ECC implementation.
For what it's worth, Tom Ritter recently posted his notes on de-anonymizing alt.anonymous.messages[1], something widely believed to be very anonymous and very secure. It's an interesting read and shows why you not only need the crypto to be sound, but the implementation and your own use of it to be right too.
[1] - http://ritter.vg/blog-deanonymizing_amm.html http://ritter.vg/blog-deanonymizing_amm.html
- maaku 13y agoHow is EC “relatively untested/unproven”? It's been in OpenSSL for ages (by internet norms), is the subject of numerous national standards. It secures a billion dollar bitcoin economy.
- redthrowaway 13y agoHe said it's not time for the average programmer to switch to a new and untested ECC implementation, not that ECC itself is new and untested. By the standards of any of the common RSA libraries out there, their ECC counterparts would be relatively untested given how much comparative use each has seen.