7 ms·

Silent Circle shuts down email service

camino020 13y ago
Interesting to see talk about what is legal and what is not. Think about this: Everything Hitler did in the Nazi Germany was legal. How a bout a law that tracking or stalking on the internet is the same as in person, therefore illegal and punishable for everyone?
3327 13y ago
true Patriots...
jstalin 13y ago
Maybe it's time for an entirely new message transmission protocol. Email clearly is insecure and not securable.
- ChuckMcM 13y ago
  I was thinking the same thing. In the past, when people have advocated replacing SMTP with something else to combat spam, that idea is always shot down with "too many clients, too much infrastructure" but if you have a new application and real demand (and it seems like there is) then you perhaps you could get enough traction to make that work.
  - rdl 13y ago
    Isn't Pond (agl's thing) that?
    - shabble 13y ago
      For those wondering, https://pond.imperialviolet.org/ https://pond.imperialviolet.org/
      - jaekwon 13y ago
        Hmm, I just started designing something quite like this. https://github.com/jaekwon/gourami/wiki/Protocol-Overview https://github.com/jaekwon/gourami/wiki/Protocol-Overview I should take a look at pond. Thanks.
        JshWright 13y ago
        Interesting 'collision' of aquatic themed names.
    - ChuckMcM 13y ago
      Perhaps. Not sure I like the 'vaporizes in a week' thing. Point to point is good, and clearly something in the middle has to be designed in such a way that traffic analysis of the middle doesn't help. And like Lavabits you have to be careful that if your server infrastructure could be modified to break security, it can be compelled to be modified with an NSL and that is why I expect anything that is solved will only be solved with a server you "own" in your residence (at least in the US) to require the whole warrant process to get access to it.
      - rdl 13y ago
        Yeah, a few people have been looking at how to do things like this too (I've been talking to them); the idea being mix-net vs. onion routing, which is the big win of being async, and sensible defaults. It's a lot easier to do confidentiality/integrity/etc. on messages vs. traffic analysis resistance vs. strong adversaries, though.
- revelation 13y ago
  It would help for another year if all the email providers could at least use TLS when talking to each other.
- jaekwon 13y ago
  For what it's worth, I'm starting a new project to do just that. The project aims to enable secure mail & file sharing. There isn't much code ATM, and the protocol hasn't been spec'd out, but I have an idea. If you want to talk more & contribute in the early protocol design phase you can find me on #gourami on freenode.
- ninthfrank07 13y ago
  What do you think of Bitmessage? https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page
  - Canada 13y ago
    I've had a lot of fun there.
- tracker1 13y ago
  Was rambling on twitter about the same... https://twitter.com/tracker1 https://twitter.com/tracker1 Thinking, you register an "address" which can only be registered/announced once... that includes a public key (software generates private key) When sending a message to someone, the entire envelope of a current email will be encrypted against the recipient's public key. That is the "msg", from there a crc32 of the msg is generated as a "sig" (signature), then a bcrypt of (address + sig) is generated as a "conf" (confirmation of intended recipient). The message is then addressed to a crc32 of the address... this allows for enough uniqueness so that super nodes don't get flooded, but still allow for some routing and query ability. When you open your client, it connects to the DHT system, and then requests the sig/conf for any messages to crc32(address) then does the calculation locally to determin if a message is actually for said user. It can then request the actual message. After N days a message should be deleted from the dht systems.
  - tracker1 13y ago
    maybe have from:crc32(addr), to:crc32(addr) with two envelopes.. the outer would be encrypted against the recipient's public key.. so that the recipient could get the sender's address and their public key to decode the rest of the content... I'm not sure how such a system could combat spam.
    - alan_cx 13y ago
      As a general point... isnt spam something worth putting up with in order to get secure email? If there is too much spam, obscuring the legit emails, couldn't the client end filter that out? Frankly, to take and extreme, if I were reliant on secure email for my life, spam would be the very least of my problems. As a totally random thought, is there no way to use spam to hide and secure legit email?
      - tracker1 13y ago
        Well, my initial thought was having the sender's hash could allow for a list of know offenders... but it would be easy enough for spammers to create thousands of address announcements... If there was a push notification based email server, where the server would have to connect to the sender's server (based on DNS entry) to pull said message, it could allow for better spam filtering... but this would remove the decentralized part. You are correct in that if I am relying on secure email for my life, then spam would be the least of my problems... but those who feel they must have secure email isn't enough to catalyst a new email system into broad use.
pkinsky 13y ago
Are they shutting down preemptively because shutting down a service that has received an NSL is illegal? I'll be watching what happens to Lavabit to find out.
- akavlie 13y ago
  Wait, what? Shutting down a service that has received an NSL is illegal? Source?
  - antimatter 13y ago
    He's asking if it's illegal, not claiming that it is.
  - drivingmenuts 13y ago
    IANAL, but a reasonable guess tells me that while shutting down the service wouldn't be illegal, you would still be on the hook for the requested data. You don't pony up, the Feds would, at a minimum, charge you with obstruction of justice and consequences would follow.
  - pkinsky 13y ago
    NSLs come with gag orders, and it's possible that the government would view shutting down a service entirely as a violation of the duty not to disclose. It gets fuzzy here, because we're speculating on how a secret court will rule on a body of secret law while working hand in glove with the NSA.
  - kbart 13y ago
    I'm not a lawyer, but I would bet that can be classified as "destruction of evidence".
- joetek 13y ago
  If they get rid of the service and the data pre-emptively, they can safely destroy the data. Once they've recieved an NSL, they have to comply with the order and provide the data (or at least the metadata) or be in contempt of court.
- 13y ago
CaveTech 13y ago
Seems more likely that this was a business decision under the guise of something else.
- llamataboot 13y ago
  citation?
  - alan_cx 13y ago
    You want a citation for what is essentially a thought? Actually, I suppose one could simply link back to the post its self, since is this the most reliable expression of that thought available.
- bredren 13y ago
  I'm in complete agreement. Excellent way to kill two birds: Sunset an underperforming product and turn Lavabit's courageous decision into marketing opportunity.
fnordfnordfnord 13y ago
"Silent Phone and Silent Text, along with their cousin Silent Eyes are end-to-end secure. We don’t have the encrypted data and we don’t collect metadata about your conversations. They’re continuing as they have been. We are still working on innovative ways to do truly secure communications. Silent Mail was a good idea at the time, and that time is past." They are keeping other services going, just shutting down email.
scarmig 13y ago
Convenient, maybe, but prematurely shutting down secure email because you anticipate the government will come out to get you effectively does the government's job for it. Albert Hirschman wrote a famous book called "Exit, Voice, Loyalty" about different styles of responses to conflict. Different strategies are certainly called for in different situations. But most exit strategies (outside of suicide) rely on retreats to spaces outside the sphere of influence of the conflict initiator. The existential space of the Internet is not the infinite, however. Although a nurturing environment for human freedom, it's also a fragile ecosystem, and giving up on a couple key nodes, in its current form, is enough to destroy it, shadowy dreams of darknets notwithstanding. When freedom retreats from all Internet spaces in the USA, that is plausibly more than enough to kill it as a haven for freedom anywhere. It's not the end of freedom or anything like that: maybe it's strategic to retreat to spaces more decentralized and harder to compromise than the Internet, and other fights can be fought and won in those. But that's not a gamble I want to make, especially because the fight for Internet freedom hasn't been lost yet! Not by a long shot. ETA: This came off harsher than I anticipated: I had no idea that Silent Circle is a project of Phil Zimmerman. Damn, that's dispiriting. Time to pop open a beer. ETA2: Yeah, I think I jumped to conclusions about their central motivation and shouldn't have implicitly doubted as much their stated reasons. Boo me.
- techscruggs 13y ago
  "Email that uses standard Internet protocols cannot have the same security guarantees that real-time communications has. There are far too many leaks of information and metadata intrinsically in the email protocols themselves. Email as we know it with SMTP, POP3, and IMAP cannot be secure." I didn't read it as they were prematurely shutting down before the government came after them. I read it as them admitting that they couldn't secure email as much as they would like and are admitting flaws in their encryption strategy.
  - revscat 13y ago
    Not their strategy, but the protocols used to handle email. There is simply no way to send emails using standard protocols without leaking information.
anologwintermut 13y ago
How is PGP encrypted email any less secure in terms of meta data analysis / eves dropping than a video call or a "text message" likely sent over OTR? Obviously, those later two protocols are forward secure and PGP is not, but that doesn't seem to be what the post is dealing with. Were they worried about key authentication? Did they not do end to end PGP?
- nikster 13y ago
  It would be up to the client to install PGP for true end to end encryption. What I was wondering - why don't they keep the email service but reject all emails that are sent without PGP? Then people would have to go through the pain of installing PGP but they would end up with truly secure email.
  - anologwintermut 13y ago
    Silent Circle is a software client and service, not a cloud hosted solution. As such, they can do PGP themselves and (from my understanding) did.
    - JshWright 13y ago
      Silent Mail was not a separate client.
- JshWright 13y ago
  Silent Mail had to inter-operate with other mail services and users (many of whom have no desire to use PGP). That means we had to touch plaintext at times (even if it was just an incoming message from a non-Silent Mail user, prior to us encrypting it and storing it for our user). It was different from the other products because mail inherently doesn't allow end to end encryption without a lot of manual key management (which is exactly why no one does it). Some day we would love to offer a service that _can_ do that, but email, in it's current form, can't do that for us. Speaking personally, I'm very excited about projects like Adam Langley's Pond.
plg 13y ago
As someone who followed Phil Zimmerman's epic battle with the US govt in the 1990s over PGP, I am seriously bummed by this news. For someone with as much personal conviction and moral depth as Phil Zimmerman to essentially pre-emptively give up on the idea of offering truly secure email, means to me, that the US government has now crossed a certain threshold that will be very very difficult to come back from. Think about it. It's chilling. The idea that a paragon of privacy and encryption, not to mention a legend in terms of standing up to the government for freedom, has now said "I fold" to the simple idea that an American company offers true privacy of email communication. How long before we have government installed microphones and cameras .... Oh never mind. It's already here. Maybe Americans will have to get their privacy tools from other countries. Think about that for a second.
- deleted 13y ago
  [deleted]
- anologwintermut 13y ago
  His claim was that it was intrinsically less secure, not that the government was stoping him
  - mpyne 13y ago
    Which I would argue is correct. It seems to be intrinsically difficult (to say the very least) to have a communications system that is open to anyone to send messages to a given address (even if the sender is not known), and supports queueing messages for eventual delivery so that both ends don't have to be online at the same time. The 'Pond' system mentioned elsewhere in this thread looks promising, for example, but that system doesn't allow for unknown people to send messages. This is perfect for many communications needs but can't supplant email entirely. But I'll note if I'm reading the user guide [1] correctly that it's going to be very difficult to setup contacts, exchange messages, etc. in something like Pond, which would make its usage inherently suspicious (and liable for increased attention thereby, if we assume general domestic surveillance). [1] https://pond.imperialviolet.org/user.html https://pond.imperialviolet.org/user.html
  - 13y ago
kintamanimatt 13y ago
We're all aware that providers can be compelled legally to backdoor aggregation points (i.e. central servers), but could they be forced to put backdoors in their client software too? What about a letter or court order compelling them to re-engineer their software to either remove strong cryptography or force all traffic through a central point, thereby killing their business?
- Canada 13y ago
  Why not? And why stop there? Why can't providers be compelled to break into peoples houses or perform assassinations?
- acqq 13y ago
  Yes, I think the only way to solve that problem is that the providers fully open source their client code and that the client code is built and proofed by the users. Still, an example where such open source existed and still the result was completely broken crypto for two years is http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0166 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0166 Good security is damn hard.
joetek 13y ago
Interesting strategy. So, while they were not able to store the content of the emails, they still retained the metadata. That metadata could be subject to subpoena, and if they destroyed the data after a request, they'd be in contempt of court. Dropping the service pre-emptively lets them delete all the data before they are asked for it.
joetek 13y ago
TechCrunch has further information: In a statement to TechCrunch about whether the shut down was only because Silent Circle felt email was insecure, CEO Michael Janke tells us “It goes deeper than that. There are some very high profile people on Silent Circle- and I mean very targeted people- as well as heads of state, human rights groups, reporters, special operations units from many countries. We wanted to be proactive because we knew USG would come after us due to the sheer amount of people who use us- let alone the “highly targeted high profile people”. They are completely secure and clean on Silent Phone, Silent Text and Silent Eyes, but email is broken because govt can force us to turn over what we have. So to protect everyone and to drive them to use the other three peer to peer products- we made the decision to do this before men on [SIC] suits show up. Now- they are completely shut down- nothing they can get from us or try and force from us- we literally have nothing anywhere.” http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/08/silent-circle-preemptively-shuts-down-encrypted-email-service-to-prevent-nsa-spying/ http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/08/silent-circle-preemptively-...
mattkrea 13y ago
Is there any standard out there for trying to create some "future" mail? Ideally it would handle--or emulate--old email clients until they had time to be upgraded but is this even under consideration now? I think now more than ever we should evaluate SMTP and see what we can do to either secure it or replace it. Looking at a barebones SMTP server in Node.js I could see some ways to very easily encrypt all data but that only goes so far.. you're still receiving the normal mail headers you would get with any other platform.. I think we need to get at this data but I am so far unaware of a solution to this beyond basic TLS. Thoughts?
llamataboot 13y ago
Wow. Evidently they destroyed all the data preemptively as well. No notice, just poof. You have to wonder if they thought the situation was dire enough to not give people any warning that their emails were being lost. I understand the decision from a security standpoint, but there must have been some fear up in that decision room. Applaud them for the tough decision. "Mike Janke, Silent Circle’s chief executive, said in a telephone interview late Thursday that his company had destroyed its server. “Gone. Can’t get it back. Nobody can,” he said. “We thought it was better to take flak from customers than be forced to turn it over.” http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/two-providers-of-encrypted-e-mail-shut-down/?smid=tw-share&_r=0 http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/two-providers-of-en...
- plg 13y ago
  This is truly stunning. Reminds me of Soviet Russia from the 1970s and 80s not America. Wow
  - rbanffy 13y ago
    I considered, for a brief moment, making a Russian inversion joke, but this whole affair is not funny. Not at all.
- kbart 13y ago
  That's harsh, but I'm glad to (finally) see an appropriate companies reaction to all this mess. Sadly, most non-technical people will not understand what such companies do and these stories unlikely hit headlines or have bigger impact on public opinion.
bredren 13y ago
I think Silent Circle saw an opportunity to kill a service that made little money, had heavy maintenance and is now making hay.
declan 13y ago
Silent Circle CTO Jon Callas has been participating in this G+ thread I started this evening: https://plus.google.com/u/0/112961607570158342254/posts/9uySMokvg7k https://plus.google.com/u/0/112961607570158342254/posts/9uyS... Excerpts: "If you're not afraid of the NSA, then encryption is good enough. If you are, then the headers in your email leak so much information that you don't really need to decrypt... Study the other headers and there are all sorts of other things that one mailer or another leaks as well as all the servers all along the way. Most importantly, all of this is permanently stored in everyone's email archives which most of us keep lots of. This is what the NSA wants. They want to construct the social graph, the interactions, the timings. This is how they get "chatter." None of this is encrypted. This is why email is broken in ways encryption can't fix..."

Interesting to see talk about what is legal and what is not. Think about this: Everything Hitler did in the Nazi Germany was legal. How a bout a law that tracking or stalking on the internet is the same as in person, therefore illegal and punishable for everyone?

3327 13y ago

true Patriots...

jstalin 13y ago

Maybe it's time for an entirely new message transmission protocol. Email clearly is insecure and not securable.

ChuckMcM 13y ago
I was thinking the same thing. In the past, when people have advocated replacing SMTP with something else to combat spam, that idea is always shot down with "too many clients, too much infrastructure" but if you have a new application and real demand (and it seems like there is) then you perhaps you could get enough traction to make that work.
- rdl 13y ago
  Isn't Pond (agl's thing) that?
  - shabble 13y ago
    For those wondering, https://pond.imperialviolet.org/ https://pond.imperialviolet.org/
    - jaekwon 13y ago
      Hmm, I just started designing something quite like this. https://github.com/jaekwon/gourami/wiki/Protocol-Overview https://github.com/jaekwon/gourami/wiki/Protocol-Overview I should take a look at pond. Thanks.
      - JshWright 13y ago
        Interesting 'collision' of aquatic themed names.
  - ChuckMcM 13y ago
    Perhaps. Not sure I like the 'vaporizes in a week' thing. Point to point is good, and clearly something in the middle has to be designed in such a way that traffic analysis of the middle doesn't help. And like Lavabits you have to be careful that if your server infrastructure could be modified to break security, it can be compelled to be modified with an NSL and that is why I expect anything that is solved will only be solved with a server you "own" in your residence (at least in the US) to require the whole warrant process to get access to it.
    - rdl 13y ago
      Yeah, a few people have been looking at how to do things like this too (I've been talking to them); the idea being mix-net vs. onion routing, which is the big win of being async, and sensible defaults. It's a lot easier to do confidentiality/integrity/etc. on messages vs. traffic analysis resistance vs. strong adversaries, though.
revelation 13y ago
It would help for another year if all the email providers could at least use TLS when talking to each other.
jaekwon 13y ago
For what it's worth, I'm starting a new project to do just that. The project aims to enable secure mail & file sharing. There isn't much code ATM, and the protocol hasn't been spec'd out, but I have an idea. If you want to talk more & contribute in the early protocol design phase you can find me on #gourami on freenode.
ninthfrank07 13y ago
What do you think of Bitmessage? https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page
- Canada 13y ago
  I've had a lot of fun there.
tracker1 13y ago
Was rambling on twitter about the same... https://twitter.com/tracker1 https://twitter.com/tracker1 Thinking, you register an "address" which can only be registered/announced once... that includes a public key (software generates private key) When sending a message to someone, the entire envelope of a current email will be encrypted against the recipient's public key. That is the "msg", from there a crc32 of the msg is generated as a "sig" (signature), then a bcrypt of (address + sig) is generated as a "conf" (confirmation of intended recipient). The message is then addressed to a crc32 of the address... this allows for enough uniqueness so that super nodes don't get flooded, but still allow for some routing and query ability. When you open your client, it connects to the DHT system, and then requests the sig/conf for any messages to crc32(address) then does the calculation locally to determin if a message is actually for said user. It can then request the actual message. After N days a message should be deleted from the dht systems.
- tracker1 13y ago
  maybe have from:crc32(addr), to:crc32(addr) with two envelopes.. the outer would be encrypted against the recipient's public key.. so that the recipient could get the sender's address and their public key to decode the rest of the content... I'm not sure how such a system could combat spam.
  - alan_cx 13y ago
    As a general point... isnt spam something worth putting up with in order to get secure email? If there is too much spam, obscuring the legit emails, couldn't the client end filter that out? Frankly, to take and extreme, if I were reliant on secure email for my life, spam would be the very least of my problems. As a totally random thought, is there no way to use spam to hide and secure legit email?
    - tracker1 13y ago
      Well, my initial thought was having the sender's hash could allow for a list of know offenders... but it would be easy enough for spammers to create thousands of address announcements... If there was a push notification based email server, where the server would have to connect to the sender's server (based on DNS entry) to pull said message, it could allow for better spam filtering... but this would remove the decentralized part. You are correct in that if I am relying on secure email for my life, then spam would be the least of my problems... but those who feel they must have secure email isn't enough to catalyst a new email system into broad use.

pkinsky 13y ago

Are they shutting down preemptively because shutting down a service that has received an NSL is illegal? I'll be watching what happens to Lavabit to find out.

akavlie 13y ago
Wait, what? Shutting down a service that has received an NSL is illegal? Source?
- antimatter 13y ago
  He's asking if it's illegal, not claiming that it is.
- drivingmenuts 13y ago
  IANAL, but a reasonable guess tells me that while shutting down the service wouldn't be illegal, you would still be on the hook for the requested data. You don't pony up, the Feds would, at a minimum, charge you with obstruction of justice and consequences would follow.
- pkinsky 13y ago
  NSLs come with gag orders, and it's possible that the government would view shutting down a service entirely as a violation of the duty not to disclose. It gets fuzzy here, because we're speculating on how a secret court will rule on a body of secret law while working hand in glove with the NSA.
- kbart 13y ago
  I'm not a lawyer, but I would bet that can be classified as "destruction of evidence".
joetek 13y ago
If they get rid of the service and the data pre-emptively, they can safely destroy the data. Once they've recieved an NSL, they have to comply with the order and provide the data (or at least the metadata) or be in contempt of court.
13y ago

CaveTech 13y ago

Seems more likely that this was a business decision under the guise of something else.

llamataboot 13y ago
citation?
- alan_cx 13y ago
  You want a citation for what is essentially a thought? Actually, I suppose one could simply link back to the post its self, since is this the most reliable expression of that thought available.
bredren 13y ago
I'm in complete agreement. Excellent way to kill two birds: Sunset an underperforming product and turn Lavabit's courageous decision into marketing opportunity.

fnordfnordfnord 13y ago

"Silent Phone and Silent Text, along with their cousin Silent Eyes are end-to-end secure. We don’t have the encrypted data and we don’t collect metadata about your conversations. They’re continuing as they have been. We are still working on innovative ways to do truly secure communications. Silent Mail was a good idea at the time, and that time is past." They are keeping other services going, just shutting down email.

scarmig 13y ago

Convenient, maybe, but prematurely shutting down secure email because you anticipate the government will come out to get you effectively does the government's job for it. Albert Hirschman wrote a famous book called "Exit, Voice, Loyalty" about different styles of responses to conflict. Different strategies are certainly called for in different situations. But most exit strategies (outside of suicide) rely on retreats to spaces outside the sphere of influence of the conflict initiator. The existential space of the Internet is not the infinite, however. Although a nurturing environment for human freedom, it's also a fragile ecosystem, and giving up on a couple key nodes, in its current form, is enough to destroy it, shadowy dreams of darknets notwithstanding. When freedom retreats from all Internet spaces in the USA, that is plausibly more than enough to kill it as a haven for freedom anywhere. It's not the end of freedom or anything like that: maybe it's strategic to retreat to spaces more decentralized and harder to compromise than the Internet, and other fights can be fought and won in those. But that's not a gamble I want to make, especially because the fight for Internet freedom hasn't been lost yet! Not by a long shot. ETA: This came off harsher than I anticipated: I had no idea that Silent Circle is a project of Phil Zimmerman. Damn, that's dispiriting. Time to pop open a beer. ETA2: Yeah, I think I jumped to conclusions about their central motivation and shouldn't have implicitly doubted as much their stated reasons. Boo me.

techscruggs 13y ago
"Email that uses standard Internet protocols cannot have the same security guarantees that real-time communications has. There are far too many leaks of information and metadata intrinsically in the email protocols themselves. Email as we know it with SMTP, POP3, and IMAP cannot be secure." I didn't read it as they were prematurely shutting down before the government came after them. I read it as them admitting that they couldn't secure email as much as they would like and are admitting flaws in their encryption strategy.
- revscat 13y ago
  Not their strategy, but the protocols used to handle email. There is simply no way to send emails using standard protocols without leaking information.

anologwintermut 13y ago

How is PGP encrypted email any less secure in terms of meta data analysis / eves dropping than a video call or a "text message" likely sent over OTR? Obviously, those later two protocols are forward secure and PGP is not, but that doesn't seem to be what the post is dealing with. Were they worried about key authentication? Did they not do end to end PGP?

nikster 13y ago
It would be up to the client to install PGP for true end to end encryption. What I was wondering - why don't they keep the email service but reject all emails that are sent without PGP? Then people would have to go through the pain of installing PGP but they would end up with truly secure email.
- anologwintermut 13y ago
  Silent Circle is a software client and service, not a cloud hosted solution. As such, they can do PGP themselves and (from my understanding) did.
  - JshWright 13y ago
    Silent Mail was not a separate client.
JshWright 13y ago
Silent Mail had to inter-operate with other mail services and users (many of whom have no desire to use PGP). That means we had to touch plaintext at times (even if it was just an incoming message from a non-Silent Mail user, prior to us encrypting it and storing it for our user). It was different from the other products because mail inherently doesn't allow end to end encryption without a lot of manual key management (which is exactly why no one does it). Some day we would love to offer a service that _can_ do that, but email, in it's current form, can't do that for us. Speaking personally, I'm very excited about projects like Adam Langley's Pond.

plg 13y ago

As someone who followed Phil Zimmerman's epic battle with the US govt in the 1990s over PGP, I am seriously bummed by this news. For someone with as much personal conviction and moral depth as Phil Zimmerman to essentially pre-emptively give up on the idea of offering truly secure email, means to me, that the US government has now crossed a certain threshold that will be very very difficult to come back from. Think about it. It's chilling. The idea that a paragon of privacy and encryption, not to mention a legend in terms of standing up to the government for freedom, has now said "I fold" to the simple idea that an American company offers true privacy of email communication. How long before we have government installed microphones and cameras .... Oh never mind. It's already here. Maybe Americans will have to get their privacy tools from other countries. Think about that for a second.

deleted 13y ago
[deleted]
anologwintermut 13y ago
His claim was that it was intrinsically less secure, not that the government was stoping him
- mpyne 13y ago
  Which I would argue is correct. It seems to be intrinsically difficult (to say the very least) to have a communications system that is open to anyone to send messages to a given address (even if the sender is not known), and supports queueing messages for eventual delivery so that both ends don't have to be online at the same time. The 'Pond' system mentioned elsewhere in this thread looks promising, for example, but that system doesn't allow for unknown people to send messages. This is perfect for many communications needs but can't supplant email entirely. But I'll note if I'm reading the user guide [1] correctly that it's going to be very difficult to setup contacts, exchange messages, etc. in something like Pond, which would make its usage inherently suspicious (and liable for increased attention thereby, if we assume general domestic surveillance). [1] https://pond.imperialviolet.org/user.html https://pond.imperialviolet.org/user.html
- 13y ago

kintamanimatt 13y ago

We're all aware that providers can be compelled legally to backdoor aggregation points (i.e. central servers), but could they be forced to put backdoors in their client software too? What about a letter or court order compelling them to re-engineer their software to either remove strong cryptography or force all traffic through a central point, thereby killing their business?

Canada 13y ago
Why not? And why stop there? Why can't providers be compelled to break into peoples houses or perform assassinations?
acqq 13y ago
Yes, I think the only way to solve that problem is that the providers fully open source their client code and that the client code is built and proofed by the users. Still, an example where such open source existed and still the result was completely broken crypto for two years is http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0166 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0166 Good security is damn hard.

joetek 13y ago

Interesting strategy. So, while they were not able to store the content of the emails, they still retained the metadata. That metadata could be subject to subpoena, and if they destroyed the data after a request, they'd be in contempt of court. Dropping the service pre-emptively lets them delete all the data before they are asked for it.

joetek 13y ago

TechCrunch has further information: In a statement to TechCrunch about whether the shut down was only because Silent Circle felt email was insecure, CEO Michael Janke tells us “It goes deeper than that. There are some very high profile people on Silent Circle- and I mean very targeted people- as well as heads of state, human rights groups, reporters, special operations units from many countries. We wanted to be proactive because we knew USG would come after us due to the sheer amount of people who use us- let alone the “highly targeted high profile people”. They are completely secure and clean on Silent Phone, Silent Text and Silent Eyes, but email is broken because govt can force us to turn over what we have. So to protect everyone and to drive them to use the other three peer to peer products- we made the decision to do this before men on [SIC] suits show up. Now- they are completely shut down- nothing they can get from us or try and force from us- we literally have nothing anywhere.” http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/08/silent-circle-preemptively-shuts-down-encrypted-email-service-to-prevent-nsa-spying/ http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/08/silent-circle-preemptively-...

mattkrea 13y ago

Is there any standard out there for trying to create some "future" mail? Ideally it would handle--or emulate--old email clients until they had time to be upgraded but is this even under consideration now? I think now more than ever we should evaluate SMTP and see what we can do to either secure it or replace it. Looking at a barebones SMTP server in Node.js I could see some ways to very easily encrypt all data but that only goes so far.. you're still receiving the normal mail headers you would get with any other platform.. I think we need to get at this data but I am so far unaware of a solution to this beyond basic TLS. Thoughts?

llamataboot 13y ago

Wow. Evidently they destroyed all the data preemptively as well. No notice, just poof. You have to wonder if they thought the situation was dire enough to not give people any warning that their emails were being lost. I understand the decision from a security standpoint, but there must have been some fear up in that decision room. Applaud them for the tough decision. "Mike Janke, Silent Circle’s chief executive, said in a telephone interview late Thursday that his company had destroyed its server. “Gone. Can’t get it back. Nobody can,” he said. “We thought it was better to take flak from customers than be forced to turn it over.” http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/two-providers-of-encrypted-e-mail-shut-down/?smid=tw-share&_r=0 http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/two-providers-of-en...

plg 13y ago
This is truly stunning. Reminds me of Soviet Russia from the 1970s and 80s not America. Wow
- rbanffy 13y ago
  I considered, for a brief moment, making a Russian inversion joke, but this whole affair is not funny. Not at all.
kbart 13y ago
That's harsh, but I'm glad to (finally) see an appropriate companies reaction to all this mess. Sadly, most non-technical people will not understand what such companies do and these stories unlikely hit headlines or have bigger impact on public opinion.

bredren 13y ago

I think Silent Circle saw an opportunity to kill a service that made little money, had heavy maintenance and is now making hay.

declan 13y ago

Silent Circle CTO Jon Callas has been participating in this G+ thread I started this evening: https://plus.google.com/u/0/112961607570158342254/posts/9uySMokvg7k https://plus.google.com/u/0/112961607570158342254/posts/9uyS... Excerpts: "If you're not afraid of the NSA, then encryption is good enough. If you are, then the headers in your email leak so much information that you don't really need to decrypt... Study the other headers and there are all sorts of other things that one mailer or another leaks as well as all the servers all along the way. Most importantly, all of this is permanently stored in everyone's email archives which most of us keep lots of. This is what the NSA wants. They want to construct the social graph, the interactions, the timings. This is how they get "chatter." None of this is encrypted. This is why email is broken in ways encryption can't fix..."