5 ms·

So, since HN is filled with smart engineers, how should one build a sustainable, fully encrypted email service untouchable by the Feds?

slg 13y ago
The technology isn't the problem here. Politics is the problem.
betterunix 13y ago
It already exists. Use PGP, send messages through anonymous remailers. If you cannot use anonymous remailers, post messages to Usenet in alt.anonymous.messages using Tor. If not Tor, then via a proxy server. If none of the above, just make sure you are not doing it from your house. If even that is impossible, know that traffic analysis will be possible. Why is this something that needs to be repeated to the technically skilled people on HN?
- sillysaurus 13y ago
  Tor is funded directly by the US govt. Something like 60-80% of their annual million-dollar budget. Maybe being superstitious isn't helpful, but in this instance, I'm not so sure Tor is able to be relied on. A proxy server won't work for the same reason a personal server wouldn't work. It's tied to you eventually, either through a paper trail or a packet trail. Oh, and drop the condescending attitude, okay?
  - betterunix 13y ago
    "Maybe being superstitious isn't helpful, but in this instance, I'm not so sure Tor is able to be relied on." Tor has been analyzed extensively by cryptographers and security researchers; there is literally a mountain of published research about it. It is operated by an independent organization. I would be more cautious about the Linux kernel, a vastly larger codebase that could and probably does have numerous back doors, than about Tor. "A proxy server won't work for the same reason a personal server wouldn't work. It's tied to you eventually, either through a paper trail or a packet trail." Which is why it is below anonymous remailers and Tor on my list. Proxy servers are better than nothing at all.
    - sillysaurus 13y ago
      Tor has been analyzed extensively by cryptographers and security researchers; there is literally a mountain of published research about it. And that research says that if an entry node and an exit node are both under control of an adversary, then that adversary can deannonymize the target. I don't know enough about it, but I know that deannonymizing someone is a matter of resources, not a matter of ability. And the USG has a lot of resources.
      - jborica 13y ago
        Much in the same way that communicating insecurely with 90% of your contacts is not going to help PGP keep your emails encrypted, requesting sites from outside of the tor network is not going to help keep your internet usage anonymous. It's a problem of behavior and adoption rate
- kevincrane 13y ago
  I assume he means one that is user-friendly enough for regular people to actually use. There's tons of ways to be totally anonymous, just very few that are practical for my day-to-day use.
- pmarsh 13y ago
  I think HN people are looking for a profitable business solution for those not technically inclined to know but want to be able email anonymously.
- drpancake 13y ago
  The measures you describe are not exactly trivial.
  - betterunix 13y ago
    Only by comparison with snake-oil like Hushmail, or with not having any security at all. We are talking about a non-trivial problem here. For what it's worth, it is not hard to encrypt a message and post it to Usenet. It is imperfect and vulnerable to traffic analysis, but it is not hard. It is even easier to just send encrypted emails and not bother with anonymity. I have personally seen non-technical people using PGP or S/MIME without assistance.
- paulnechifor 13y ago
  It exists in the same way tablets have existed for a very long time. But we don't just communicate with technically skilled people. Something that can be used by everybody and can be trusted would be really awesome.
- tracker1 13y ago
  I would think using something like DHT to "publish" an alias/address and PGP key, to relay up to X MB/GB of data per day could work... decentralized... anyone can see the messages going across, but only the intended recipient could actually read said messages. There would be no login system to intercept.
davidw 13y ago
Hard to say because no one knows what they can and can't decrypt.
bigiain 13y ago
Like many "technical solutions", at least most of the answer is easily found - PGP. Also, like many "technical solutions", the answer _isn't_ a technical solution. The bigger problem is people. PGP _will_ secure my email. But out of my almost 1000 contacts I've got only a few dozen with PGP keys. While 95%+ of an email network's users _aren't_ using encryption, the network is fundamentally insecure. That's not an engineering problem - that's a people problem. The EFF, Wikileaks, CryptoParties, and individuals like you and me – have a far more important role in making sure "a sustainable, fully encrypted email service untouchable by the Feds" exists – not by building anything new, but by convincing your friends and coworkers and bosses and parents that it's important and possible right _now_.
- slowriot 13y ago
  It's not a people problem, it's a design problem. The technology is there, it just needs to be integrated in a way that makes it 'just work' for everyone.
  - bigiain 13y ago
    I'm not so sure - "strong passwords" mostly "just work", but ~25% of passwords in published hash dumps still fall to the RockYou wordlist, and another 10 or 15% with the best64 rules in hashcat. When given the option between "laziness" and "security", it's abundantly clear which most people choose. I strongly believe that as well as "easy to use technology", we very much need to educate our friends/family/coworkers on the need for encryption and the risks of not using it.

slg 13y ago

The technology isn't the problem here. Politics is the problem.

betterunix 13y ago

It already exists. Use PGP, send messages through anonymous remailers. If you cannot use anonymous remailers, post messages to Usenet in alt.anonymous.messages using Tor. If not Tor, then via a proxy server. If none of the above, just make sure you are not doing it from your house. If even that is impossible, know that traffic analysis will be possible. Why is this something that needs to be repeated to the technically skilled people on HN?

sillysaurus 13y ago
Tor is funded directly by the US govt. Something like 60-80% of their annual million-dollar budget. Maybe being superstitious isn't helpful, but in this instance, I'm not so sure Tor is able to be relied on. A proxy server won't work for the same reason a personal server wouldn't work. It's tied to you eventually, either through a paper trail or a packet trail. Oh, and drop the condescending attitude, okay?
- betterunix 13y ago
  "Maybe being superstitious isn't helpful, but in this instance, I'm not so sure Tor is able to be relied on." Tor has been analyzed extensively by cryptographers and security researchers; there is literally a mountain of published research about it. It is operated by an independent organization. I would be more cautious about the Linux kernel, a vastly larger codebase that could and probably does have numerous back doors, than about Tor. "A proxy server won't work for the same reason a personal server wouldn't work. It's tied to you eventually, either through a paper trail or a packet trail." Which is why it is below anonymous remailers and Tor on my list. Proxy servers are better than nothing at all.
  - sillysaurus 13y ago
    Tor has been analyzed extensively by cryptographers and security researchers; there is literally a mountain of published research about it. And that research says that if an entry node and an exit node are both under control of an adversary, then that adversary can deannonymize the target. I don't know enough about it, but I know that deannonymizing someone is a matter of resources, not a matter of ability. And the USG has a lot of resources.
    - jborica 13y ago
      Much in the same way that communicating insecurely with 90% of your contacts is not going to help PGP keep your emails encrypted, requesting sites from outside of the tor network is not going to help keep your internet usage anonymous. It's a problem of behavior and adoption rate
kevincrane 13y ago
I assume he means one that is user-friendly enough for regular people to actually use. There's tons of ways to be totally anonymous, just very few that are practical for my day-to-day use.
pmarsh 13y ago
I think HN people are looking for a profitable business solution for those not technically inclined to know but want to be able email anonymously.
drpancake 13y ago
The measures you describe are not exactly trivial.
- betterunix 13y ago
  Only by comparison with snake-oil like Hushmail, or with not having any security at all. We are talking about a non-trivial problem here. For what it's worth, it is not hard to encrypt a message and post it to Usenet. It is imperfect and vulnerable to traffic analysis, but it is not hard. It is even easier to just send encrypted emails and not bother with anonymity. I have personally seen non-technical people using PGP or S/MIME without assistance.
paulnechifor 13y ago
It exists in the same way tablets have existed for a very long time. But we don't just communicate with technically skilled people. Something that can be used by everybody and can be trusted would be really awesome.
tracker1 13y ago
I would think using something like DHT to "publish" an alias/address and PGP key, to relay up to X MB/GB of data per day could work... decentralized... anyone can see the messages going across, but only the intended recipient could actually read said messages. There would be no login system to intercept.

davidw 13y ago

Hard to say because no one knows what they can and can't decrypt.

bigiain 13y ago

Like many "technical solutions", at least most of the answer is easily found - PGP. Also, like many "technical solutions", the answer _isn't_ a technical solution. The bigger problem is people. PGP _will_ secure my email. But out of my almost 1000 contacts I've got only a few dozen with PGP keys. While 95%+ of an email network's users _aren't_ using encryption, the network is fundamentally insecure. That's not an engineering problem - that's a people problem. The EFF, Wikileaks, CryptoParties, and individuals like you and me – have a far more important role in making sure "a sustainable, fully encrypted email service untouchable by the Feds" exists – not by building anything new, but by convincing your friends and coworkers and bosses and parents that it's important and possible right _now_.

slowriot 13y ago
It's not a people problem, it's a design problem. The technology is there, it just needs to be integrated in a way that makes it 'just work' for everyone.
- bigiain 13y ago
  I'm not so sure - "strong passwords" mostly "just work", but ~25% of passwords in published hash dumps still fall to the RockYou wordlist, and another 10 or 15% with the best64 rules in hashcat. When given the option between "laziness" and "security", it's abundantly clear which most people choose. I strongly believe that as well as "easy to use technology", we very much need to educate our friends/family/coworkers on the need for encryption and the risks of not using it.