4 ms·

> * Be served from a server that uses HTTP-level compression this is the only must-have. Last 2 exist almost in every website (everyone needs a CSRF token, e

• steveklabnik 13y ago
  My blog does not have CSRF tokens, and does not reflect user input. Many web _apps_ have these things, but many web sites do not.
• homakov 13y ago
  since it's attack on secrets then we don't even consider blogs and read only media as targets :)
  • steveklabnik 13y ago
    Absolutely, I'm just saying that your statement that it's the only must have is factually incorrect. I could include some sort of secret on every page, but since my blog doesn't reflect user input, it would be fine. I could also have a 'search' function that would reflect input, but without the secret in the body, the secret would be fine. All three parts are a must-have, even if they are incredibly common. Saying otherwise is misleading.
• jamoes 13y ago
  From my understanding (which may be wrong...), the requirement of "Reflect user-input in HTTP response bodies" is actually pretty important. If the application only does this on POST requests, then it should probably be fine. Since an attacker cannot formulate a valid POST without the CSRF token (assuming the app is using CSRF tokens correctly), then there is no way for an attacker to get this attack bootstrapped. If the application reflects GET request input in the response (eg `https://domain.tld?q=ASDF` https://domain.tld?q=ASDF` results in some `value="ASDF"` being included somewhere in the response), then it is indeed likely vulnerable. This allows the attacker to simply continually change the value of `ASDF` as they guess and check for some secret on the page. Of course, if your application is allowing untrusted POSTs to be made, then you will still have to worry about POST requests...
  • homakov 13y ago
    you're right, also, to make compression work, ASDF is not enough, attacker needs https://domain.tld?q=value="ASDF https://domain.tld?q=value="ASDF