Without having sat on the jury, I will have to rely on public documents for the relative size of Goldman's proprietary business. This may not meet your standar

Without having sat on the jury, I will have to rely on public documents for the relative size of Goldman's proprietary business. This may not meet your standard of proof. After the Volcker rule, it has become much tougher to find data on principal transactions, so let's go back to 2010 and look at the Financials of their annual review. http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/current/annual-reports/2010-ar-pdf-files/GS_AR10_Complete_Fin.pdf http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/cu... On page 58 of the document (page 91 of the footnotes, since it starts at 34) revenues from "Other principal transactions" is $6+ billion for the year. Revenue from "Market Making" is $13+ billion. It can be murky where this activity falls, but it's definitely one of those buckets. On page 69(102) you get a breakout of which product areas these come from. Without going too deep, it's just worth observing that it's multiple billions of dollars of risk across each of these area. Going to another source, on page 3 of this paper (http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1689&context=cis_papers http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1689...) they quote Goldman estimating the size of High Frequency Trading to be $0.5 billion in revenues, with others estimating it to be $1.5 to $3 billion. Do I know enough to say how much of this he was accountable for? Enough that he would get a big offer to work somewhere else. And I am very confident that he knew that copying this model was against the law. Everyone in this type of environment knows this.