3 ms·
Related is work by T. Kohno, A. Broido, and K. Claffy [2] where, too, small deviations in device hardware is exploited for device identification, in this case c
by mafribe 13y ago
Related is work by T. Kohno, A. Broido, and K. Claffy [2] where, too, small deviations in device hardware is exploited for device identification, in this case clock skew.
[1] http://homes.cs.washington.edu/~yoshi/papers/PDF http://homes.cs.washington.edu/~yoshi/papers/PDF
- weland 13y agoThis is very interesting. It makes me wonder how it could be countered. If I understood the points of the article correctly (but, to my shame, I haven't read it very thoroughly -- I'm posting this more under the excitement of the moment), one could get some basic success by inserting small, random jitter into the timestamp it sticks on the packets. However, this isn't exactly stellar because, if the attacker can collect enough data, averaging out the random jitter to isolate a constant (or constantly-changing, which is a good approximation for most hardware clocks over the period of time we're considering) skew. So perhaps a better option would be to add a biased jitter that gets changed at some more or less random, but short enough interval?