4 ms·
So are you saying that there was no deliberate hijack, but rather AS25459 was configured not to carry traffic to those IPs, and it's blackholes got propagated?
by shubb 13y ago
So are you saying that there was no deliberate hijack, but rather AS25459 was configured not to carry traffic to those IPs, and it's blackholes got propagated?
- cbhl 13y agoI think the author is merely worried about how much of BGP relies on operators trusting each other to configure their networks properly. All it takes is one typo somewhere to bring down the internet for half of America. Granted, seeing how slowly IPsec and DNSSEC are being adopted, I think the author is fighting an uphill battle.
- toomuchtodo 13y agoCertificate pinning in mobile apps goes a long way to preventing a leak of secure data. Sure, you can't get to your service while the hijack is occurring, but you don't have to worry you just submitted your login and password info to a hijacked/malicious IP block. Better to fail closed in this case. Disclaimer: I use PNC Bank, who was part of this hijack.
- peterwwillis 13y agoWhat does this have to do with certificates and mobile data? Hijacking an IP is the same as a man-in-the-middle, which PKI prevents without needing to "pin" a cert. You have to first control a trusted CA before you can do real MITM, and if you have that, it's much more effective to simply MITM the existing route and not expose yourself by changing BGP routes all over the place. (Also, a mobile app bundled with a cert "pinned" for that app is effectively just public-key cryptography, so you don't even need to use the global PKI infrastructure at that point)
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]