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Skin in the Game as a Required Heuristic for Acting Under Uncertainty
- VMG 13y agoIn some sense, the same ideas he has always written about, but again expressed in a new way. I like it.
- steveinator 13y agoInteresting read. I liked the reference to Ralph Nadar... Those who vote in favor of war should be required to enlist in a draft. Though I don't know how serious I can take this when the guy uses the word 'wonks' in reference to those he disagrees with. Also I think that the lack of 'skin in the game' encourages risk, which counteracts a natural tendency for large groups to be more conservative (look at big business vs small). If you made decision makers have skin in the game, you'd have even less innovation and new ideas in large institutions. This is taking into account factors beyond his thesis, but leads to interesting thoughts when it comes to practical application of his ideas.
- jessaustin 13y ago...the guy uses the word 'wonks' in reference to those he disagrees with. This is a pretty mild epithet coming from NNT. He has described the same group in much less complimentary terms.
- md224 13y agoI could be wrong, but I believe the term "policy wonk" is not necessarily negative... I assumed it simply referred to one who is well-versed in policy debates and data. For example: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
- graeme 13y agoThis is correct. source: extensive reading of political blogs + newspapers circa 2006-2008.
- paganel 13y ago> Those who vote in favor of war should be required to enlist in a draft. The same as those people that were counting bananas or such after the Fukushima incident should have been given incentives (including financial ones) to move close to the affected area, with their families and kids. You either trust your words and computations or you're not.
- tlb 13y agoIt doesn't mention any negatives of requiring skin in the game. The most obvious is adverse selection: risk-averse people won't enter a profession where mistakes are severely punished, so you get only risk-seekers.
- aston 13y agoI'd be interested to hear examples of professions where you think we want risk-averse people involved in inherently risky activities without skin in the game. Are these activities beneficial to society?
- draz 13y agoMedicine :-)
- phaet0n 13y agoDoctors do have "skin in the game". They face rigorous scrutiny for their medical actions.
- tlb 13y agoMedicine. Startup founders. Car designers. Airline pilots. Of course, all these guys have some skin in the game now. I'd argue that in all these professions, artificially increasing the penalties for failure wouldn't make the world better.
- michaelfeathers 13y agoI haven't read the paper yet but I remember reading someplace that the fundamental of economics is that if you introduce costs into a system, you should bear them.
- jdmitch 13y agothe skin in the game heuristic relates directly to the virtue of being such that the system will not only survive uncertainty, randomness, and volatility but will actually benefit from it. Doesn't Taleb mean that the 'skin in the game' heuristic will prevent uncertainty, randomness and volatility in the system rather than bring benefit? Within examples such as the 07-08 financial crisis, which he must be referring to indirectly, 'skin in the game' would have meant less risk-taking, therefore reducing volatility. But I can't see how the system would have actually benefited from volatility.
- bdcs 13y agoTaleb defines a system as "anti-fragile" if it benefits from volatility. His previous works build up a mathematical framework for distinguishing between things which are harmed by fragility, things which are neutral to fragility, and things which are benefitted from fragility, which are fragile, robust, and anti-fragile, respectively.
- jfasi 13y agoWhat's so mathematical about it? It has lots of pretty graphs and charts, but as far I could tell, it's just philosophy masquerading as mathematics.
- md224 13y agoI was a bit confused by this too, but perhaps he means that in an ideal system of universal skin-in-the-game, volatility and chaos will serve to optimize the system by triggering failure for those who took risks unwisely and, therefore, providing negative/corrective feedback to the system overall. In other words, if you want a system to evolve robustness, you probably want to expose it to a diverse array of inputs.
- verdatel 13y agoSuch a simple heuristic, but I think with far-reaching consequences. Last week, NNT posted a link to a news article with talked about a new law in an Indian state that required headmasters to taste the food that was served in the school cafeteria. This was initiated after a bad case of contaminated food and deaths resulting from it.
- pizza_boy 13y agoIt's not immediately obvious there's anything new or interesting in there: how is this heuristic different to a classic Hansonian bet [1]? One potential advantage is that having "skin in the game" has a more positive connotation than betting on outcomes, to the general public at least. Regardless, Hanson at least deserves a mention. From a stylistic point of view I'm not a big fan of the appeals to authority (e.g., "the ancients were fully aware" ) either. From a startup perspective it's worth mentioning that mentorship or advice is also generally more confusing and less useful when the mentor lacks "skin in the game". Hence mentor "whiplash". [1] http://www.overcomingbias.com/2013/07/bets-argue.html http://www.overcomingbias.com/2013/07/bets-argue.html
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- tedsanders 13y agoGood points. However, I don't think that "the ancients were fully aware" is an appeal to authority. I think the idea is ancient people tended to use things that were successful; therefore if the ancients used something, we should boost our confidence in it (relative to the baseline).
- pizza_boy 13y agoYou're partially correct. I'd say that we tend to adopt the successful cultural adaptations of our ancestors and discard the others. In other words, when comparing an ancient society to one descended from it, I'd expect the "successful" adaptations of the ancestor culture to be disproportionately present in the descendant. The converse need not be true. In Taleb's example Taleb of the builder, those ancient heuristics became our tort law (and will be a part of our reputation networks in the future). He doesn't mention all the cultural adaptations we've since dropped... So it's obvious at best, and an appeal to authority at worst.
- pfraze 13y agoI gave the paper a quick skim. My thoughts: As they point out in the paper, there are some cases where risk is intentionally removed, such as through bankruptcy for businesses to protect entrepreneurs. I think that can have positive effects. I'm not fully convinced that "academic economists, quantitative modellers, and policy wonks"..."have no disincentive and are never penalized by their errors." I believe their reputation is at stake. The authors may mean they have no financial risk, but their reputation is tied to their future earnings. I'm not sure that's a bad thing as long as it's considered. Overall I'd say there's nothing surprising in this paper, nor any specific proposals (as I hoped) but mostly a philosophical argument made in reaction to the current financial and political environment. I do agree with their premise. As a political view, I think "Skin in the Game" would make a pretty good slogan. It would be interesting to implement distributed trust networks around this concept. If there are clear failure/success signals, you could have nodes present a bond which is destroyed on success and paid out on failure. Automated damages collection, I suppose.
- graeme 13y agoHis point is that there's rarely a reputational hit for being wrong in those professions. There should be, but there isn't. Examples: Thomas Friedman supported the Iraq war. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZwFaSpca_3Q http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZwFaSpca_3Q Joseph Stiglitze and Peter Orzag predicted Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac faced near zero risk. Stiglitz later claimed credit for predicting the financial crisis(!) and Orzag had a prominent position in Obama's administration http://www.pierrelemieux.org/stiglitzrisk.pdf http://www.pierrelemieux.org/stiglitzrisk.pdf What commentator can you think of that's lost his job for a bad prediction? Pundit's have perverse incentives. They can point to correct predictions to boost their career, and they are penalized very little for wrong ones. They have an incentive to make many predictions, and retrospectively choose to highlight only those that panned out.
- TheCowboy 13y agoTo be fair, Fannie Mae changed its practices, engaging in the risky "financial innovations" that caused problems for a lot financial institutions, after Stiglitz' original study of their exposure to risk. It is not as if Stiglitz was in control of the institution or encouraged that they engage in these more risky behaviors. It is more like a doctor performing a check-up on a patient, which represents a mere snapshot in time, saying they're in good health. And then the patient decides it's okay to start smoking, eating fastfood for every meal, and giving up exercise. Are you going to blame the doctor for not warning this could happen? I would say the stronger lesson is that continued checks and oversight are critical to the health of any institution or business. Though I do also agree and think people who make sloppy predictions should also be held accountable for their behavior.
- MBlume 13y agoSo what happens to the authors of this paper if we take their advice and it goes badly?
- zzleeper 13y agoNothing of course! It's one of the wonders of being an economist ;) (sarcasm aside, I do think there should be stronger professional repercussions in economics for advocating idiotic policies. It's one thing to found a startup and fail, and then start again; it's another to cause a deep recession in a country and then say "oh well, let's try again")
- moments 13y agoThe author follows this rule: only recommend a strategy that is currently used. If the advice goes badly, the author also suffers. Such recommendations are more reliable than those from authors without 'skin in the game'.
- lhnz 13y agoI wrote a blog article about requiring skin-in-the-game the other day. My food for thought is: Small transactional costs stop things from existing at the fetal/growth stage. Evolution destroys them long before the long-term benefits demonstrate themselves as it supports short-term adaptive traits over long-term adaptive traits. If you require skin-in-the-game transactional costs then your transactions will happen far less often, and in the short-term you will get out-competed for resources by those that protect themselves with top-down regulations. It is often difficult for third-parties to evaluate the authenticity of a cost or regulation, which is why institutional costs exist - they factor out hundreds of checks of hundreds of transactions into a single check of the institution that regulates hundreds of transactions (which itself is often proxied by the social proofing of this institution.) This lowers the transaction cost which causes high growth. Fetal is really a good analogy here. The womb exists for good reason; scaffolds exist for good reason; decorum on first dates exists for good reason. Without these things early transactional costs defeat growth. In short, skin-in-the-game evolves out of artificial systems as it is bad for early-growth. However this does not mean that it should; in well-designed/natural systems the entity first exists in a protective bubble during its gestation period and then slowly has its skin placed in the game.
- neilk 13y agoI don't think your analogies apply. We do not demand that a fetus bear the cost of its bad decisions, because it is incapable of making decisions. (But we might start exposing a child to consequences of its bad actions, in proportion, quite early.) Similarly, a building under construction is incapable of advising someone to buy stocks. And first dates do not usually result in land wars in Afghanistan. Can you give an example of a process or profession which can be said to willfully expose others to risk, which does deserve this sort of protection when it's just starting out? It seems to me that such responsibilities are nearly the definition of maturity.
- eclipxe 13y ago>And first dates do not usually result in land wars in Afghanistan. Keyword: usually.
- bayesianhorse 13y agoInvestors need to act as if they could stomach a total loss on the investment, founders need to act as if they can't survive failure on the venture. Now imagine that these two roles usually exist in the same person, to varying degree.
- graeme 13y agoThe comments here seem to miss Taleb's central idea that harm is non-binary. You need to consider not just whether something occurs, but how much impact it has. I don't care whether a bank earns a financial gain or a loss. I care how big the gain or loss is. One hundred years of small profits can be wiped out in one bad quarter. I do not believe Taleb is proposing punishing all risk taking. He's advocated aggressively taking risks where the downside is known. The problem we face is that many are now in a position to get a limited, positive upside if things go well, but they face no downside. And the potential harm in such situations has no upper bound. Skin in the game ought to be proportional to harm. Many comments mention medicine as a profession that should not have skin in the game. Rubbish. Doctors are very liable if things go wrong. But it depends how wrong. We don't hold doctors accountable for small errors, or random errors. We hold them accountable for big errors. The bigger the error, the worse the punishment.
- khawkins 13y agoThere's an issue in convincing people that harm is completely continuous. If there is a perception that there is some culpability in performing some action, regardless of how small, then it is easy to exaggerate it to a significant quantity in their mind. This would make society increasingly hostile and litigious for even small gestures like offering to watch their stuff while they visit the restroom.
- stretchwithme 13y agoNothing educates you like an actual personal loss. If its always other people's money, people will figure out how to game it. And those okay with gaming it will soon crowd out the rest, as they can work for less because they get paid extra for gaming it. If the banks writing bum mortgages had to take the loss instead selling all the losers to Fannie and Freddie, many bum loans would have never been made.
- jka 13y agoI'm re-watching The Wire at the moment, which I'm enjoying greatly, and one of the best things about it is watching the lengths that the characters go to in order to avoid being personally linked with criminal operations under their control. They benefit when the organization benefits, but aim to avoid the downsides when their staff's activities are exposed. As long as there are areas with very high reward (investment banking, drug dealing, human trafficking, startups), and enterprising individuals with the connections to organize them (either through experience and leadership progression, or by using opportunities to undermine former leaders / acquire resources), people will rise to these opportunities. Once an operation reaches a certain size however, many leaders become disconnected - intentionally or otherwise - from the day-to-day business of their organization. Given the typical attitudes on HN, I'd expect that most founders here would be genuinely mortified to find out if their software had caused real-life problems - most would take a lot of care to ensure good user experience and correct results; these make good business sense too. However I think many would eventually aim to become distanced from the business too - the dream of reliable passive income. Meanwhile, we imagine - and it's not hard to imagine - that many bank executives, criminal leaders, and others - actively enjoy their life in distance and immunity while feeling little remorse for the damage they do, and certainly not taking any intrinsic risk for it. We expect that the rule of law will deal with these problems when they occur - that's what optimistic films and positive fiction tell us - but the reality is that a good-enough combination of wealth, influence, leverage over others, and wits can let people stay at arms-length from (but in control of) nefarious affairs even if they are aware that they are causing harm. In some ways I think this expresses itself even in the trend for honest businesses to avoid liability where possible -- if we take liability for what we do, we also have to do the best we can and take genuine care of our customers. Somehow a fear of litigation, genuine exploitation of litigation (c.f. ambulance-chasers), and fear of decreased business efficiency have reached the level where companies do prefer to distance themselves. Often it is via lacklustre or even laughable attempts, such as using oft-ignored in-store signage, disclaimers, or automated customer interactions. Retreating from each other for fear of risk isn't healthy as a general trend, and neither is our inability to reach and re-integrate those who expressly intend to maintain their distance to avoid risk to themselves.
- zilupe 13y agoThis is why I believe more in devops approach. When ops and dev are separate it's both developers acting in an environment with little useful feedback and ops always able to blame developers.
- stofu 13y agoMy favorite example of skin in the game is riding a bicycle. Compared to driving a car with a ton of metal and five airbags around you, riding a bike means that you literally have skin in the game. On the other hand driving a car you basically have no skin in the game. You jump a red light or drive too fast and as long as the cops don't catch you it's alright.
- mathattack 13y agoDoes this really solve the problem? The execs at Lehman and Bear had skin in the game. Sure some of the senior-most folks got away with small fortunes, but everyone last money. Some people lost their life savings. Conceptually this makes sense (similar to requiring all derivatives trades to have margin requirements to limit leverage) but does it really fix what went wrong?