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I've always been fascinated with naïve set-theory, and how it was refuted after it's apparent inconsistency, the famous Russell's paradox of the set of all sets
by runarberg 13y ago
I've always been fascinated with naïve set-theory, and how it was refuted after it's apparent inconsistency, the famous Russell's paradox of the set of all sets that don't contain it self, and only contains it self if it doesn't etc. So supposing it's False, yields True, and supposing it's True yields False.
But what fascinated me was not the Russell's set, but it's inverse, the set of all sets that contain it self, lets call it S.
For the statement S is a member of S —the set of all sets that contain it self, really contains it self— yields True if and only if you suppose it's True, and it yields False if and only if you suppose it's False.
S is therefore always consistent no matter the value. Both values are correct, but never at the same time.
I don't know particularly what it means, but the fact that you can do this, makes me wonder if this super-consistency is applied anywhere else in the philosophy of science, but nobody has ever realized the equivalent inverse, and therefor never demonstrated the inconsistency.
- gizmo686 13y agoS doesn't seem that interesting. Assume that S does not contain itself. Consider the set P, which can be constructed by adding P as an element to S. Note that P contains itself. Therefore, P is in S. Also note that every other element in P is also in S, and that every element in S is in P. Therefore P and S are the same set. Therefore S contains itself, contradicting our assumption that S does not contain itself. If we assume that S does contain itself, then I do not see a way at arriving at a contradiction.
- runarberg 13y agohmm, you are correct. S really isn't that interesting. And my scepticism towards justification through non-contradiction because of possible super-consistancy is therefor based on false premises.