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- Keep passwords in memory (so as if you start the service it prompts for the password) - Asymmetrical crypto. So for example, you encrypt your CC data upon si
by raverbashing 13y ago
- Keep passwords in memory (so as if you start the service it prompts for the password)
- Asymmetrical crypto. So for example, you encrypt your CC data upon sign-up but then to run the charges you need the private key (and this is somewhere else)
- Enable SSL communication with your DB. Postgres has this, because being defeated by network sniffing is bad.
- ra 13y agoMemory is not secure. It's quite a common attack to grab keys / passwords from the memory of an executing program.
- raverbashing 13y agoNo, it is one of the safest places. If your attacker has access to arbitrary memory of a process, you're using an insecure OS/version. Or they dumped your process memory using a vulnerability (in your system) Yes, there are some possible attacks (page file, cache, etc) Attacking memory after a reboot requires physical access (unless you hibernated without an encrypted file, in this case...) It certainly beats the security of file/network
- ra 13y agoJust because it's more secure than network / file doesn't mean it's secure. That's why we have smartcards / HSMs.
- raverbashing 13y agoSmartcards are vulnerable as well and there has been successful attacks towards some smartcards (google it) And not every system has an HSM available
- ra 13y agoSure but smartcards and HSMs are slow and in a properly managed environment are much safer than memory. Whether or not the OP has an HSM is moot. The OP said, "I want to design and implement a solution as secure as it can be" ... and that means (among many other things) keys on HSM.
- nandemo 13y agoIn the first case, what if we're running a service in a cluster that starts instances automatically?