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But then, you get to take responsibility for that entire stack. This is a bad thing. Remember PHP register globals? Rails 2.x? Perl 4? I'd bet a lot of laz
by zdw 13y ago
But then, you get to take responsibility for that entire stack. This is a bad thing.
Remember PHP register globals? Rails 2.x? Perl 4? I'd bet a lot of lazy devs would still be using those if they could just wrap it all up into a container and say "run this!" That's what commercial products do. And they're much worse for security as a result.
Fundamentally, I'd say the solution is to automate testing and installation. Make it extremely easy for a dev to test app A against a matrix of language implementations B, C, D, databases E, F, G, and OS platforms H, I, J. Make it easy to make packages that install natively on each platform, with the built-in package management tools. FPM and similar help with this. Nearly every platform will allow you to create your own package repos. Better tools = better code = more flexibility = less ecosystem dependency
Containerization as a logical separation for security (ala chroot/jails before it) makes sense, but doing it so you can shove your whole OS fork in there and then fail to maintain it seems foolhardy and myopic.
- jacques_chester 13y agoWhat I notice about all your examples is that they are stack problems that an application could not, on its own, have fixed. In the current model, each part of the stack has an independent lifecycle, creating shear points and hidden security flaws. If the application can control the whole stack, then the application author can fix it. Automating test and install just puts you back where you started: with a gigantic test matrix that will impose non-trivial drag on the whole application's development. And it's not necessary. It's just ... not. necessary.
- zdw 13y agoIt is necessary if you don't share the platform of choice with the developer. Everyone who is running OS X, BSD, Illumos, Cygwin, and basically every non-Linux OS would take issue with your necessity argument. I also note that you didn't mention the problem of security issues in bundled dependencies, which is the far more serious issue.
- jacques_chester 13y agoWe're talking about different things. I am not talking about an app that is distributed to be installed "on" OS X, BSD, Illumos etc. I am talking about an app that is packaged to run "on" Xen, VMWare, or maybe docker (LXC) for some cases. Or zones for others. Or jails. Whatever. The point is that you, the application designer, ask yourself, "what happens if I have total architectural discretion over everything from the virtual hardware up?"
- zdw 13y agoAh, I get your point now. But, rather than the panacea you envision, what I think would actually happens is you end up with a lot of people doing substandard OS release engineering jobs, neglecting security patches, etc. Or... Cargo culting around a small number of "thin OS distributions", which is substantially the same as what we have today. Heck, "total architectural discretion over everything from the (virtual) hardware up" is pretty much the definition of an OS distribution. Am I missing the point here? Is there something about this other than the word "virtual" slapped on there that's unique from what we have now?
- jacques_chester 13y ago> Is there something about this other than the word "virtual" slapped on there that's unique from what we have now? Yes: virtual machines and VPS hosting make it possible to bypass shared hosting. That means you needn't write apps which have to aim for lowest common denominator. Edit: I agree that the approach I'm advocating introduces new problems. But obviously I think that it's still better than the status quo, which is largely set by path dependency.
- justincormack 13y agoI think you just end up moving the work around. Not sure the current concentration of security at a few points (distros) has scaled. Most web application developers do not use a distro stack anyway for much. Most of the security issues in a distro apply to stuff you don't use, although it may be installed. Traditional Unix was a much more minimal thing.
- jrochkind1 13y ago> If the application can control the whole stack, then the application author can fix it. You are right, but the other point is that it becomes the application authors responsibility to fix it. If you're bundling apache httpd with your app, and there's a security flaw and a new version released, it becomes your responsibility to release a new version of your app with the new version of httpd. If there are 1000 apps doing this, that's 1000 apps that need to release a new version. Instead of the current common situtation, where you just count on the OS-specific package manager to release a new version. Dozens of copies of httpd floating around packaged in application-delivered VMs is dozens of different upgrades the owner needs to make, after dozens of different app authors provide new versions. (And what if one app author doesn't? Because they are slow or too busy or no longer around? And how does the owner keep track of which of these app-delivered VM's even needs an upgrade?)
- jacques_chester 13y agoYou're describing what you see as the advantages of the shared hosting scenario and in the blog post I linked, I explain why I think that business will be progressively squeezed out by VPSes and SaaS. In any case, there's no difference in kind between relying on an upstream app developer and an upstream distribution. You still need to trigger the updates. And you might have noticed that stuff is left alone to bitrot anyhow.
- justincormack 13y agoThe problem is the matrix of versions to test against gets huge. And your code gets littered with workarounds. Its difficult.
- borplk 13y agoThe application author can provide an updated container if there's a security problem. If not you can install the updated version of the affected package within the container. The value of not having to support 5 different web servers and 5 data bases etc... is far far too great to ignore. If anything it will likely reduce a lot of issues and bugs. Since you are dealing with only one stack you can devote your time to make sure it is rock solid.
- smacktoward 13y ago> The application author can provide an updated container if there's a security problem. Yes, but now it's their responsibility to stay on top of updates for the entire stack, and push out updated containers whenever any part of it changes. Whereas in the traditional model staying on top of updates to anything other than the application itself is the responsibility of the user or his/her sysadmin. Not saying containerization of apps isn't a promising concept, just that it does require the app developer to take on a lot of additional responsibility.
- samstave 13y agoBut doesn't that ignore the move toward IaaS we are seeing? Where a customer is buying compute time, instead of access to install an app onto a managed OS? It's getting to the point where very soon we will have complete clouds on demand - we pretty much already have them, but soon that will be a trivially selected level of granularity. We can deploy OpenStack clusters extraordinarily easy now with Fuel. Having fully deployed app clouds is pretty much already here, if not just around the corner.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]