OK, I should have written "everyone that matters"; the point is to have a critical mass of expensive-to-eavesdrop communications, so that the NSA cannot routine

OK, I should have written "everyone that matters"; the point is to have a critical mass of expensive-to-eavesdrop communications, so that the NSA cannot routinely exploit much more than teenager gossips traded through Facebook. Moreover, even if only the 10% best informed people use PRISM-proof communications, it's a safe bet that NSA's alleged targets (whatever the current definition of "terrorist" might be) are among them, so the argument that they're doing that to catch "terrorists" doesn't hold water anymore. I believe the tech community is concerned about this, because it threatens the robustness of Internet. Today, nobody in the business can pretend with a straight face that top-level certification authorities are trustworthy; so I expect the next generation of security protocols, the successors of the (transparent and enabled by default) SSL, to treat governments as opponents. I also believe that companies will change their security patterns, e.g. stop trusting American third parties such as Microsoft if they have competitors with political connections in Washington.