4 ms·
Ballmer got it wrong regarding the iPhone, but I doubt that doing nothing was an option in that case. Against its rivals in the computer segment, Microsoft did
by guizzy 13y ago
Ballmer got it wrong regarding the iPhone, but I doubt that doing nothing was an option in that case.
Against its rivals in the computer segment, Microsoft didn't have to act, but Apple came at them from a different angle; by leveraging its dominant position in the music player market. Nokia, which had a crushingly dominant place in the smartphone business when Apple joined, tried the "just keep doing what you do" strategy for a long while; their marketshare steadily dropped. Probably not coincidentally, it was an ex-MS exec Elop that changed that strategy, with results comparable to Microsoft's. RIM is still clinging to it, with no success.
In comparison, Google had a more measured, deliberate approach, but they did react to Apple. When Apple went into the smartphone business, Google was gearing up to fight against Nokia, RIM and Microsoft. The disruption caused by Apple forced Google to reevaluate. They figured out key places where Apple was unable or unwilling to compete on, and capitalized on those.
- regularfry 13y agoMy memory is that MS were ready to go with an actually decent, capable release of Windows Phone (WP6.5? maybe?), which then got clobbered and reworked into a consumer OS when they panicked over how well the iPhone was doing. Apple didn't come at them in an unavoidable way at all - Apple was going for a small sector of the consumer market, where MS could have ripped the business market away from an already-floundering RIM inside a generation. It's just not Apple's way to target enterprise functionality the way MS can.
- yuhong 13y agoAt least it wasn't as bad as the MS OS/2 2.0 fiasco: http://yuhongbao.blogspot.ca/2012/12/about-ms-os2-20-fiasco-px00307-and-dr.html http://yuhongbao.blogspot.ca/2012/12/about-ms-os2-20-fiasco-... (notice my reference to the PX00307 anti-trust exhibit which shows some of the decision making back in 1990)
- twoodfin 13y agoWhy was this a "fiasco"? The result of the process outlined in that memo was, not to put to fine a point on it, one of the most profitable business decisions in world history. I admire Gordon Letwin as much as the next guy, but OS/2 was never going to be the commercial success that Windows became, for basically the reasons the memo lays out: Windows 3.0/3.1 absolutely dominated the exploding PC market because it was targeted at hardware that anyone could afford. OS/2 was dependent on a level of hardware that wouldn't be commonplace until another generation or two of Moore's Law cycled through. Microsoft simply didn't have that time to waste, and neither did their customers. The choice was between abandoning a phenomenally successful OS and API for the "next generation", or slowly building a bridge from that OS into the future carrying their customers with them. They made the right call, even if it did take roughly 11 years until Windows XP for the transition to truly be complete.
- yuhong 13y agoYes, but OS/2 2.0 was not going to be released in 1990 either so it would be stupid to abandon Windows 3.x immediately anyway. And as I mentioned in the comments, nothing prevents the two from coexisting for a few years with OS/2 2.x being compatible with Win3.x.
- twoodfin 13y agoSo which one should PC developers have targeted? Both? When one was selling at something like 20x the rate of the other?
- yuhong 13y agoWin3.x (OS/2 2.x would be able to run Win3.x apps) or both, but this problem would only last a few years at most. Eventually 286s and <4MB of RAM would become obsolete. (And BTW OS/2 2.x not running well in 4MB of RAM had more to do with the Workplace Shell, MS had similar difficulties with the Explorer shell too)
- yuhong 13y agoTo be honest the iPhone 3G was released only one year after the original iPhone.