> Because the precedent is clear: Smith v. Maryland makes it okay to collect phone metadata, done. I should have brought up Smith. My mistake. My opinion of Sm

> Because the precedent is clear: Smith v. Maryland makes it okay to collect phone metadata, done. I should have brought up Smith. My mistake. My opinion of Smith is basically this: It's at odds with other cases, and its logic rests on a much older picture of the technology. Unfortunately, I don't have time to write a lengthy prediction of how Smith will someday be eroded or overturned. But for now I'll say that I consider Smith to be an outlier with respect to the broader trends in 4th Amendment law I'm attempting to highlight. > You claim I'm "cherry-pick[ing] a certain definition of 'yours'" but that's precisely what you do when you're characterizing one side of an argument. Fair enough. My intention in cherry-picking a different definition was to offer an alternative to the one you presented, simply to show that it's not so cut-and-dry. Perhaps I should have been more explicit about my rhetorical intentions there. > As for plausibility--you cite a dissenting opinion, a concurring opinion, and one of the most handwave-y opinions in the history of the Court (Griswold) All of which are valid citations. If you were a SCOTUS judge, you'd have the right to take these citations with a grain of salt. But their existence still helps illuminate how the justices think about privacy. By the way, which one was the dissent? (Not doubting you, just seeking clarification.) > Finally: U.S. v. Jones was based on meat and potatoes Constitutional law: Scalia's majority opinion focused on the physical intrusion necessary to install the GPS tracker. Yes it did, which is why I quoted Alito's concurrence as a roadmap for the future.