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I see these cars all over where I live. It really is no different than the meta data that the NSA is collecting and most likely we will see defense of the gathe
by Shivetya 13y ago
I see these cars all over where I live. It really is no different than the meta data that the NSA is collecting and most likely we will see defense of the gathering using similar rebuttals, namely YOU have a right, the license plate/car/phone/database does not.
Apparently they want to use indirect collection or collection by private groups as somehow not falling under the 4th because of how it was assembled. I guess they could take all of a grocery stores purchase records and do the same, after all they aren't look at you directly under the guise of fixing health issues.
Eventually data, wherever it may exist, will have to land at the Supremes to declare how abstract it has to be before it is not subject to the Constitution. Based on past cases it may not bode well for us.
- rayiner 13y ago> It really is no different than the meta data that the NSA is collecting and most likely we will see defense of the gathering using similar rebuttals, namely YOU have a right, the license plate/car/phone/database does not. You're mis-characterizing the rebuttal in both cases. 1) With metadata the rebuttal is that the Constitution refers to the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects..." There is a legitimate argument that AT&T's records about when you used their network is not your papers or effects. You didn't create the record, AT&T did. You don't usually even have access to the information, AT&T does. It's not something silly like "the phone doesn't have a 4th amendment right." 2) The rebuttal for gathering information from cameras is that the 4th amendment has never extended to what the government can observe about you in a public place. The 4th amendment doesn't mean "I have a right to have the government not track or monitor me without a warrant." It says exactly what it means: the police can't search your person or your house, your papers or effects, without a search warrant supported by probable cause. The farther you get from that plain language, the more tenuous your argument becomes. Vis-a-vis the Supremes, at least Sotomayor has questioned whether it might be necessary to rethink at least the third party doctrine, which is the basis for (1): http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_data_question_should_the_third-party_records_doctrine_be_revisited http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_data_question.... I don't think anyone any time soon would think about revisiting the rule for plainly visible activity in public spaces, which is the basis of (2).
- jarrett 13y ago> With metadata the rebuttal is that the Constitution refers to the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects..." There is a legitimate argument that AT&T's records about when you used their network is not your papers or effects. You didn't create the record, AT&T did. You don't usually even have access to the information, AT&T does. It's not something silly like "the phone doesn't have a 4th amendment right." You caused the record to come into being by making or receiving the phone call. No human intervention was required on the carrier's part. Your action triggered an automated response by a machine. The records are about you, were generated by your actions, and exist pursuant to a service contract you hold. To say it is not "yours" is to cherry-pick a certain definition of "yours:" one based solely on who holds the property rights. But there are other reasonable definitions of "yours." Ordinary English usage illustrates this. I could talk about "your records at the phone company," and nobody would find my turn of phrase the slightest bit odd, even though you don't own those records. It should be noted that Constitutional interpretation generally looks to the ordinary meaning of words first. Indeed, in Katz, the Court held: "The existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate." By a narrow reading of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects," phone data might not be your papers or effects. However, one ought not read the 4th amendment narrowly. The Supreme Court said in Griswold: "The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-522 (dissenting opinion). Various guarantees create zones of privacy...These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one." The cases cited in Griswold and those which cite it lay out a doctrine of broadly interpreting privacy rights provided by the 4th and other Amendments. Words like "their" should not be construed narrowly to limit a person's privacy rights. Instead, we have the doctrine of "reasonable expectation of privacy." That is, where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 4th Amendment protections come into play. For a telephone call, one should reasonably expect the phone company to generate logs, if only for billing purposes and aggregated, anonymized data analysis. However, one would not reasonably expect the sum total of their personal call history to be available to the government. > The rebuttal for gathering information from cameras is that the 4th amendment has never extended to what the government can observe about you in a public place. This is not true. See, for example, US v Jones (the GPS tracking case). Jones strengthened the doctrine of "reasonable expectation of privacy," enshrining a new application in public places. I expect that we'll see a case about facial recognition, license plate tracking, or something similar where the government assembles a database of your movements in public. Alito's concurrence in Jones reads a prelude to these future cases: "In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The surveillance at issue in this case—constant monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four weeks—would have required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance. 10 Only an investigation of unusual importance could have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement resources. Devices like the one used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap...But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period."
- codyb 13y agoIt's the indefinite retaining the data which concerns me. I don't believe in everything in black and whites. Perhaps you collect data and save it for a fortnight and within that fortnight presumably any crimes which may have occurred within a certain area will be known and one might start looking for cars which were within the area. After a fortnight if nothing comes to pass, then presumably you really don't need the data from that locale. And the case might even be made for up to 6 months or a year since sometimes criminal investigations do take some time. Perhaps you make the case that within a fortnight an area needs to be declared a crime scene in order for the license plate collection data to be maintain for up to a year. But then you save the data for the foreseeable future and who knows what happens with it. Sheriff Arpaio or some gung ho type like that decides computer programmers needed to be monitored and bam, every where I've been for years on end shows up on a map? That seems a little iffy even if the scenario seems far fetched right now (really far fetched since I don't have a license much less a car at this point in my life, but asides aside).
- speedyrev 13y agoI think you quoted me and posted in the wrong place. What about a system that had no data retention but could actively scan and compare to a list of plates that had warrants, Amber Alerts or BOLO's. Surveillance is only going to get easier with tech. Rules of use is what is important.
- codyb 13y agoOh, I actually had not seen your post as it was a little farther down. Sometimes I don't make it all the way through ;-). I had responded to shivetya just to say what I believed. Your post seems exactly in line with what I was trying to say though in a lot of ways. Rules of use are exactly what are important and the fact is that most communities have not held votes to decide upon them despite the implementation of these scanners and the holding of the data. We need to decide as a people whether this is a national, state, or even county by county issue as well. It is public. You are on a public roadway. But what rights does that give to law enforcement to retain your driving records for an indefinite amount of time?