The most interesting alternative solution right now to make zero-confirmation transaction safe is rather counter-intuitive: "However we can make zero-confirmat

The most interesting alternative solution right now to make zero-confirmation transaction safe is rather counter-intuitive: "However we can make zero-confirmation transactions safe without complex trusted identity systems, ironically by making it easier to double-spend. If we implement replace-by-fee nodes will always forward the transaction with the highest overall fee (including parents) even if it would double-spend a previous transaction. At first glance this appears to make double-spending trivial and zero-confirmation transactions useless, but in fact it enables a powerful counter-measure to an attempted double-spend: the merchant who was ripped off creates a subsequent transaction sending 100% of the funds to mining fees. All replace-by-fee miners will mine that transaction, rather than the one sending the funds back to the fraudster, and there is nothing the fraudster can do about it other than hope they get lucky and some one mines their double-spend before they hear about the counter spend. The transaction can also be constructed such that the payee pays slightly more in advance, with the merchant refunding the extra amount once the transaction confirms, to ensure that a double-spend will result in a net loss for the fraudster." - https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=251233.msg2669189#msg2669189 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=251233.msg2669189#ms... In English, if you want to reverse a transaction, IE cancel a payment, the most you can steal from the person you paid is the value of the transaction itself. But if we implement a system where you can change a transaction after the fact, sending more of the fees to miners, the merchant can always outbid you, so it's almost impossible to actually get away with the theft and gain anything. You'll still pay for whatever you stole, thus turning what was a profitable attack, into a unprofitable attack that at best is simple vandalism. Namecheap isn't going to care much if a thief lost $10 when their loss was at most a $0.17 registrar fee. Disclaimer: I'm working on implementing this feature in Bitcoin, although it's John Dillon's idea.