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So, this is nice, but it's not going to "NSA proof" your email in any meaningful sense. You're still going to be exchanging plain text email with most counter p
by mseebach 13y ago
So, this is nice, but it's not going to "NSA proof" your email in any meaningful sense. You're still going to be exchanging plain text email with most counter parties, and unless you require TLS (as is mentioned in the end, and which will lose you quite a bit of email), you can trivially be MITM'd. Also, the author appears to run it on Linode, ie. a VPS in the US. In other words, the encrypted filesystem is only marginally more complicated to get at than a non-encrypted one.
But that doesn't mean it isn't an extremely useful guide. What would be even cooler was if it would be productized, e.g. by packaging a VM image or as Puppet/Chef recipes - this would make leaving GMail a much simpler proposition to a much larger audience (and make large scale collection of emails, if not impossible, then significantly more complicated) - just get a cheap VPS, do a git clone on the recipe and invoke puppet.
- dmix 13y agoThere is an email service that offers what the article explains: https://countermail.com https://countermail.com
- eli 13y agoIs it safe from the Feds compelling them to insert a backdoor? http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/ http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/
- dmix 13y agoNo but neither is the setup of the article mentioned. PRISM is all signal intelligence. That is what SSL/PGP effectively solves. Wiretapping (rootkits or backdoors) are almost impossible to stop. The endpoint is always the weakest point. And I'm sure the NSA spends millions on the latest exploits. No 3rd party hosting service is capable of preventing that. > Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on. Unfortunately, endpoint security is so terrifically weak that NSA can frequently find ways around it.