4 ms·
But what if the government, specifically under the argument of national security, wanted a chip manufacturer to use a specific algorithm? They may want to do th
by joshuak 13y ago
But what if the government, specifically under the argument of national security, wanted a chip manufacturer to use a specific algorithm? They may want to do this not to create a general weakness or backdoor. That is to say not a backdoor that just anyone could use, but a specific backdoor that only the NSA (not even the chip manufacturer) knew.
Such a back door could be accomplished with tools like Dual_EC_DRBG (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG).
- tptacek 13y agoNSA does not need a ludicrously inefficient RNG design to backdoor your crypto.
- joshuak 13y agoReally, because they have a better way? Either they are just dumb and designed Dual_EC_DRBG by accident, or they design systems like that for a purpose. Your assessment of what they need is an assertion, based on what exactly? Security is designed not around what one thinks an attacker needs, or why they would want do do something. It's about preventing an attacker from getting access to things a person wishes to keep secure regardless of why they would want to. In that light weaknesses in random number generators is a relevant field of inquiry. Otherwise simply ignore cryptography altogether, trow up your ands and say why bother.