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One would think that burden of evidence would be on the side of the accusers of backdooring. So far all I have seen is inaccurate speculation.
by pbsd 13y ago
One would think that burden of evidence would be on the side of the accusers of backdooring. So far all I have seen is inaccurate speculation.
- willurd 13y agoIt is. That doesn't mean we have to marginalize people who have theories, even if they don't have any evidence to back them up. My approach is to entertain all possibilities until they are proven to me to be false. In that way I attempt to avoid tunnel vision.
- cmccabe 13y agoCare to buy some of my tiger repellent? It's been 100% effective so far!
- willurd 13y agoHow many tigers have you repelled? Which species? I'm particularly worried about bengal tigers in my apartment complex. Can it handle those?
- cmccabe 13y agoI don't have "any evidence to back it up" but it "has not proven to be false." So because you're "avoiding tunnel vision" you should purchase some. Luckily, I'm willing to let it go for $999 a can. Don't marginalize me, bro.
- willurd 13y agoI was actually going to suggest $1099. Can I pay that instead?
- lostnet 13y agoThat is how the legal system works, so do you seriously plan to arrest the NSA? But the topic here is about maintaining a secure system. You must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that every element is either secure or allowed to be owned by your antagonist. Technically no one should have ever trusted something that can not be observed (and it sounds like the people responsible didn't.) If you chose to trust intel for no good reason, then you must now untrust them given that there is a reason. As a company they would be idiots to introduce such a thing. But if every US company can clearly be threatened with even worse outcomes into going against its own market interests then such an argument does not apply. As a side note, I do think there was already plenty of evidence that the US was actively forcing companies to do the NSA's bidding. The encryption export laws were largely designed to keep everyone who makes encryption products perpetually afraid of losing all their right to export anything mostly by "governmental discretion" on handling the companies inevitable 'incidents' of support talking to the wrong person about how RSA worked.