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MegaUpload, LastPass and others are provably not able to access your information. Storing the encryption key yourself is the way to go. But then the govt can c
by EGreg 13y ago
MegaUpload, LastPass and others are provably not able to access your information. Storing the encryption key yourself is the way to go.
But then the govt can capture you and make you give up the key. A whistleblower can threaten to have more incriminating evidence disseminated encrypted somewhere, and if he doesnt check in every 30 days it gets released ... but then the government can just torture him until it makes him give up the key he uses to check in every 30 days. It wouls take a really stubborn guy to persist and let the information be released. Since you dont have any information like that anyway, just assume that if you can access your own data the govt can compel you to do it for them.
- dchest 13y agoMegaUpload, LastPass and others are provably not able to access your information Where can I find the proof you're talking about?
- swaroop 13y agohttps://www.grc.com/sn/sn-256.htm https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-256.htm
- dchest 13y agoSorry, this is the first time I'm seeing a security proof in the form of interview, so I can't find it. Could you point out the relevant part? Also, what about Mega?
- DanBC 13y agoGibson is about as credible as I am when it comes to security - ie, not very.
- dchest 13y agoCredibility doesn't matter, as I'm not asking for a confirmation from an expert: EGreg claims there is a security proof of some kind.
- Jayschwa 13y agoIf you want to prove it to yourself, fire up Wireshark.
- dchest 13y agoSorry, I'm too tired to continue this bullshit conversation in a different tone, so here's a somewhat angry rant. EGreg said "provably not able to access your information", which means that there's a proof of some kind. What the fuck does "prove it to yourself" in your comment mean? That I'm now responsible for writing the security proof? That you acknowledge that no such proof exists, but I can write it myself? Oh, you probably didn't mean "prove", you meant "ensure", as in I can ensure that the traffic between Mega and my browser is encrypted. What does this say about security? Absolutely fucking nothing! It's a known fact that Mega is NOT secure. Even if you store your key locally, and they don't know it today, they can do the fuck they want with their web pages: next time you login, they can send you a piece of JavaScript to decrypt everything, or read your key, or... just do anything! If you're looking for an example, this happened with HushMail (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushmail http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushmail). Anyway, I didn't really mean to ask for a proof, because I know that there's no security proof that "Mega, LastPass and others" are not able to access my information, I was looking for a way to encourage EGreg to do some research and declare that he was wrong, because his claims are fucking dangerous. I certainly didn't expect replies like yours.
- jiggy2011 13y agoLastpass does encryption client side. The difference is that would require an active attack (pushing new code in an update) with a chance of being spotted by a reverse engineering attempt.
- eps 13y agoWho says that the backdoor hasn't been shipped since the first release and just sits there idle waiting for a nudge from the server? A larger point that security is based on trust. Trust is based on assumptions, especially and exclusively when it's a closed source software. Assumptions that what the company says is true. Now we know that they can be forced to lie and any claims of the security just crumble as a house of cards. Even if LastPass would've been an open-source, it made a little difference as the company could've been forced to distribute binaries made from altered sources. It wasn't easy to build trust before, but it's going to be nearly impossible to build it now. Though it's not to say there isn't plenty of people who are after pseudo-security and who are easily lulled by cross-my-heart promises squirting out of every second company now.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- mtgx 13y agoIf you use forward secrecy, you shouldn't have any key to give, right? DDG recently announced support for forward secrecy.
- EGreg 13y agoAre you sure? And in any case how would you know? Perfect forward secrecy is hard to implement with TLS: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html "So how do you run forward secrecy with several servers and support session tickets? You need to generate session ticket keys randomly, distribute them to the servers without ever touching persistent storage and rotate them frequently. However, I'm not aware of any open source servers that support anything like that."