2 ms·
This issue just does not pass the rubber hose test. If the NSA wanted and got a backdoor in intel chips there are so many better ways to do it than introducing
by starmole 13y ago
This issue just does not pass the rubber hose test. If the NSA wanted and got a backdoor in intel chips there are so many better ways to do it than introducing a bad hw rng. If you wanted one exploit in the chip, why would you pick a hard to exploit one and user controlled one on top of that? It's classic paranoid thinking: People have a choice to use the hw rng or not. So it becomes a big deal. All the while not addressing the non-choice issue like having a potential backdoor triggered by a specific instruction sequence.
- fauigerzigerk 13y agoIt also needs to be hard to detect and relevant specifically for crypto operations. So where would you put a backdoor on a chipset?