3 ms·
I have a modest proposal. All FISA court decisions are published, with identifiers (names, IP addresses, country names, etc) redacted, after 10 years. After 3
by btilly 13y ago
I have a modest proposal.
All FISA court decisions are published, with identifiers (names, IP addresses, country names, etc) redacted, after 10 years. After 30 years, unredacted copies are published.
This lets us know the scope of the spying. This allows for public feedback to let the FISA court know what people do. This lets everyone - including our intelligence services - understand that there are real consequences to spying on allies, and we shouldn't do it when they don't want it.
For those who complain that this limits what we can do because revealing our programs will upset allies, I would point out that history shows that programs tend to get revealed anyways. Therefore we should assume that people will eventually find out what we are doing, and not do things that are objectionable. Having an explicit timetable keeps our secret agencies from continuing to repeat this elementary mistake.
- mpyne 13y agoI like the idea (though I might limit disclosures of spying on a country $FOO to countries with a bilateral agreement not to spy back or to be similarly transparent). I don't think it addresses the concern of capturing haystacks before we know which needles to look for but it would certainly help with transparency. Even more importantly, it ingrains in the mind of the analysts actually using these systems within the intelligence agencies, and the FISC itself, that there is that concern for eventual public disclosure. Therefore, they should be inherently suspicious of anyone trying to avoid adding a given FISA warrant to the public disclosure list, or otherwise trying to interfere with public disclosure (such as by going around FISA). And as I've mentioned before it would be even better if this kind of thing were built-in to the systems themselves so that an analyst or their supervisor couldn't choose to 'forget' to do it.