3 ms·
> 3) If attacker has physical access to machine, and machine is powered on (direct memory access via Thunderbolt or Firewire) I'm curious if this could be addr
by dmix 13y ago
> 3) If attacker has physical access to machine, and machine is powered on (direct memory access via Thunderbolt or Firewire)
I'm curious if this could be addressed with software protections somehow? Something that triggers memory wipes and automatic shutdowns?
- anologwintermut 13y agohttp://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-technology/trusted-execution-technology/malware-reduction-general-technology.html http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-tech... Though that specifically obviously requires hardware.
- dmix 13y agoIt seems that only protects against "pre-launch software" and BIOS level stuff. The scenario in question is for a live system where the disk is mounted and decrypted, with the OS running.
- sil3ntmac 13y agoFileVault 2 is supposed to be secure against this* when the machine is powered on and locked or sleeping. * Source http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/18720/how-secure-is-filevault-2-while-the-computer-is-in-sleep-mode http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/18720/how-secure...
- dmix 13y agoInteresting. Apparently LUKS/dmcrypt on Linux is also protected from DMA attacks (firewire/thunderbolt devices). > If you enable LUKS root, DMA attack mitigation is also enabled(boot.initrd.luks.mitigateDMAAttacks ). It consists of blacklisting firewire drivers. Edit: still at risk of the "Evil Maid Attack" http://www.aspecrypt.com/evil_maid_attack.html http://www.aspecrypt.com/evil_maid_attack.html