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(1) Even the simplest paper ballots are already counted by computer (central tabulators). Central tabulators that run on insecure computers and do all of their

by halviti 13y ago

(1) Even the simplest paper ballots are already counted by computer (central tabulators). Central tabulators that run on insecure computers and do all of their math using the most rudimentary microsoft access databases (no password protection, little user control, remote access via dial-up modem). (2) Slot machines are already protecting millions upon millions of dollars from countless people who would love to be able to modify those machines' behavior. (3) A backup-paper trail would reduce error and allow for recounts. You vote, a receipt gets printed, you confirm that the printed paper represents your vote, and you're done. (The paper stays with the election commission)

josephlord 13y ago
1) Maybe in some jurisdictions but not in others. For the most part in the UK we have rooms of people counting and bundling papers. 2) Yes but the people who control those machines don't want to modify them (they want some winners for publicity but mostly losers and they are preconfigured for profit without modification). 3) If the receipt indicates your vote this opens the voter to bribery or coercion. If it doesn't how does it confirm that you vote was correctly recorded. Even if it does indicate your vote it is still non-trivial to confirm the validity of the election from it. You basically need to publish all the votes (with receipt numbers) and anyone whose vote doesn't match their receipt could flag it as rigged. This doesn't do anything to prevent digital ballot stuffing though.
vidarh 13y ago
> (2) Slot machines are already protecting millions upon millions of dollars from countless people who would love to be able to modify those machines' behavior. There difference is motivation. If a slot machine pays out too much, the company that makes them won't get any more business. If a voting machine favours certain candidates, those candidates benefit from letting that continue (if they weren't instigating it to begin with) and often they might have been the ones in power when they voting machines in question where chosen. > (3) A backup-paper trail would reduce error and allow for recounts. You vote, a receipt gets printed, you confirm that the printed paper represents your vote, and you're done. (The paper stays with the election commission) This I agree with, and it would satisfy most concerns with electronic voting if you combined it with paper recounts of some random districts and, say, and districts with small margins or unusually large shifts. Focusing all that much on the security of the voting machines is a sideshow, IMHO. You need some level of security, but pretty much any security mechanism you introduce will be inferior to recounts based on receipts collected using tried and true methods of paper, sealed boxes and independent observers. Focusing on a solid recount solution that includes rules for when to trigger automatic manual paper recounts won't just catch malevolent interference with machines but also reduce the chance of problems due to bugs, hardware and software failures and all kinds of other problems. But of course it'll cost more than switching to a purely electronic system, and that extra money won't go in vendors pockets.
- eli 13y ago
  Slot machines will also happily record a timestamped log of every interaction with the system and the outcome. Which is exactly what you don't want in a voting machine.

by halviti 13y ago

josephlord 13y ago

1) Maybe in some jurisdictions but not in others. For the most part in the UK we have rooms of people counting and bundling papers. 2) Yes but the people who control those machines don't want to modify them (they want some winners for publicity but mostly losers and they are preconfigured for profit without modification). 3) If the receipt indicates your vote this opens the voter to bribery or coercion. If it doesn't how does it confirm that you vote was correctly recorded. Even if it does indicate your vote it is still non-trivial to confirm the validity of the election from it. You basically need to publish all the votes (with receipt numbers) and anyone whose vote doesn't match their receipt could flag it as rigged. This doesn't do anything to prevent digital ballot stuffing though.

vidarh 13y ago

> (2) Slot machines are already protecting millions upon millions of dollars from countless people who would love to be able to modify those machines' behavior. There difference is motivation. If a slot machine pays out too much, the company that makes them won't get any more business. If a voting machine favours certain candidates, those candidates benefit from letting that continue (if they weren't instigating it to begin with) and often they might have been the ones in power when they voting machines in question where chosen. > (3) A backup-paper trail would reduce error and allow for recounts. You vote, a receipt gets printed, you confirm that the printed paper represents your vote, and you're done. (The paper stays with the election commission) This I agree with, and it would satisfy most concerns with electronic voting if you combined it with paper recounts of some random districts and, say, and districts with small margins or unusually large shifts. Focusing all that much on the security of the voting machines is a sideshow, IMHO. You need some level of security, but pretty much any security mechanism you introduce will be inferior to recounts based on receipts collected using tried and true methods of paper, sealed boxes and independent observers. Focusing on a solid recount solution that includes rules for when to trigger automatic manual paper recounts won't just catch malevolent interference with machines but also reduce the chance of problems due to bugs, hardware and software failures and all kinds of other problems. But of course it'll cost more than switching to a purely electronic system, and that extra money won't go in vendors pockets.

eli 13y ago
Slot machines will also happily record a timestamped log of every interaction with the system and the outcome. Which is exactly what you don't want in a voting machine.