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I wouldn't say SSL "withstood scrutiny" after all. We now know that state actors routinely MIM popular services with rogue keys (Iran, Turkey, Egypt, China and
by toyg 13y ago
I wouldn't say SSL "withstood scrutiny" after all. We now know that state actors routinely MIM popular services with rogue keys (Iran, Turkey, Egypt, China and Syria are the ones we know about), and are happy to steal keys to distribute malware (US/Israel with Stuxnet). It was fairly robust in the 90s when knowledge was scarce, but as malicious actors got more confident with the technology, it started to show the cracks.
Now with PRISM and total global surveillance becoming a sad reality, we could certainly do with more decentralized approaches and (ideally) overcoming the "authority" paradigm (but this will likely remain a dream).
- jerf 13y agoThose are weaknesses in the signing authorities. Signing authorities are a layer of SSL, and a rather high one. It is possible to use SSL without them. I have an app I've written that uses SSL, and since it's essentially one thing we own talking to another thing we own (from a security perspective), there's no signing authority, no Verisign, no NSA, just, is this the exact SSL cert we issued to this SSL user or not? Not that there aren't other problems at times with SSL, especially depending on how you use it, but your criticism may be more limited than you realize.