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I think this is a bit of a cheap shot at tptacek so will defend him in his absence. First, when it comes to programs by US intelligence agencies (both previous

by Jd 13y ago

I think this is a bit of a cheap shot at tptacek so will defend him in his absence. First, when it comes to programs by US intelligence agencies (both previously known, currently revealed, and yet to be revealed) there are multiple categories of evaluation: namely, ethical, legal, constitutional. Generally speaking, everything the Feds are doing is legal in the sense that it follows a specific legal process that was setup in the scare over terrorism, which both expanded the powers of the executive branch and created "shadow courts" which presumably provide some checks and balances in the system. Of course, we can't really know how reliably these work since the process for National Security Letters and other aspects itself is secret. Nonetheless, there are specific process in places that seem generally speaking to be followed. How often there are "exceptions" to this process is difficult to ascertain, and has not really been a focus in the present debate. When it comes to constitutionality, it is a hotly debated topic among Americans partially because it was the bedrock of the American state, but an increasing number of Americans (including justices) either aren't knowledgable or don't care about the specifics of the constitution. This is a huge topic, but it is sufficient to say that something can be unconstitutional (even blatantly so) and nonetheless be legal. In this specific case, it is difficult to know how or whether the protection against "unreasonable" searches includes storage of metadata associated with phonecalls that can be searched by an analyst. Then, more broadly, there are a wide representation of ethical issues. For example, it is completely legal and constitutional to spy on non US citizens, but are there any boundaries that should be set on what is and is not acceptable behavior? My strongly held view is that, at least when it comes to US hq'ed companies with a large foreign user base that they provisions in places for non US citizens should at the very least be the same as those for US citizens. However, saying that something should exist and implementing it are two different things, and one is considerably more difficult than the other. So this is all basically to defend tptacek and say that it is important to differentiate when accusing the US government of "crimes." In other words, there are lots of unethical things that you can do that are perfectly legal.

specialist 13y ago
I'm mocking the "direct action" fabricated controversy. I apologize that wasn't more clear. I fully expected Craig Timberg to be attacked, just like Glenn Greenwald was. It is unfair that I'm using a nym, whereas tptacek's a real identity. It may be unfair to single out tptacek out of the mob of people banging the "direct action" drum. He stands out here on HN. Since I'm using a nym, I won't belabor the point.
- Jd 13y ago
  As I assume tptacek would also say, the specifics of the "direct access" are rather a big deal. If the access is constrained to NSLs approved by judges in regulated quantity, you have a legal process. Perhaps there is no independent oversight or accountability to the public at large, yet you still have legality. However, if any analyst can at whim look at the info associated with any gmail account / Facebook user / etc. then you have a clearly extra-legal approach with absolutely no accountability. Also, there is a significant difference between capacity and use. If a analyst or a sys admin for the NSA has capacity to view things but does not actually have permission from the NSA to use that capability absent an NSL, then To be honest, to date nothing has emerged that makes it seem that the NSA has this sort of capacity, except when it comes to Verizon phone calls, although I don't think we know much if anything about the NSA's downstream capabilities when it comes to major Silicon Valley firms. In short, I assume that Google, Facebook, etc. are telling an important truth when they say that access is limited to legal processes. Whether or not the NSA also has and uses downstream access to similar data is another question altogether.

by Jd 13y ago

specialist 13y ago

I'm mocking the "direct action" fabricated controversy. I apologize that wasn't more clear. I fully expected Craig Timberg to be attacked, just like Glenn Greenwald was. It is unfair that I'm using a nym, whereas tptacek's a real identity. It may be unfair to single out tptacek out of the mob of people banging the "direct action" drum. He stands out here on HN. Since I'm using a nym, I won't belabor the point.

Jd 13y ago
As I assume tptacek would also say, the specifics of the "direct access" are rather a big deal. If the access is constrained to NSLs approved by judges in regulated quantity, you have a legal process. Perhaps there is no independent oversight or accountability to the public at large, yet you still have legality. However, if any analyst can at whim look at the info associated with any gmail account / Facebook user / etc. then you have a clearly extra-legal approach with absolutely no accountability. Also, there is a significant difference between capacity and use. If a analyst or a sys admin for the NSA has capacity to view things but does not actually have permission from the NSA to use that capability absent an NSL, then To be honest, to date nothing has emerged that makes it seem that the NSA has this sort of capacity, except when it comes to Verizon phone calls, although I don't think we know much if anything about the NSA's downstream capabilities when it comes to major Silicon Valley firms. In short, I assume that Google, Facebook, etc. are telling an important truth when they say that access is limited to legal processes. Whether or not the NSA also has and uses downstream access to similar data is another question altogether.