2 ms·
I don't think you actually need to do the keyboard thing. You should be able to use "accessibility" features to bring up a soft keyboard (or just cut and paste
by rdl 13y ago
I don't think you actually need to do the keyboard thing.
You should be able to use "accessibility" features to bring up a soft keyboard (or just cut and paste from known things) to run the entire attack as a normal-appearing HID mouse, which just happens to be evil. No need to reconnect via a hub; you could do the whole thing within a mouse controller. Bonus points if you can manage to fit all the logic in the same processor/memory the thing includes by default, or something which looks like the same physical package and thus passes a non-destructive open-device analysis.
(which is kind of terrifying if you think about it; almost no one checks the provenance of "dumb" devices like mice. Keyboards sometimes get a tiny bit more scrutiny due to hardware keyloggers inside inline, but that's about it.)
The ultimate solution is a trusted supply chain and equipment which is tamper-evident, non-counterfeitable, and which can securely attest to intactness and provenance; x9.9 pinpads and hsms. But no one does that for general purpose hardware.
- akira2501 13y agoExcept the mouse doesn't know exactly where it is on the screen, or how it's concept of CPI (counts per inch) relates to pixels on the screen.
- rdl 13y agoThat's a pain, but I think I could work around it by observing the human's use of the mouse for a while; there are some known actions (let's restrict to Windows), like clicking on start menu and some other stuff. By watching and calibrating, you could get a good idea what to do. You also might know a lot about the target environment; maybe they have totally standardized configurations including mouse speed, display size, etc. The environment I'm thinking about is something like a SCADA control system for, say, a centrifuge cascade :)