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If the problem in OTR is we can't rely on users to verify who each other are, then any solution is going to inherit exactly the same problem because the only so
by XorNot 13y ago
If the problem in OTR is we can't rely on users to verify who each other are, then any solution is going to inherit exactly the same problem because the only solution to it is external trusted parties.
On top of that, PGP is exactly a step backwards if you're worried about just observation of metadata because PGP with web-of-trust cryptographically ties every message you send forever back to the key which sent it. OTR on the other hand treat the keys as inherently disposable and relies on the only correct verification protocol which is user knowledge of each other.
You have to choose which problem you find more important: either you can be very anonymous, or very sure of who you're talking to but never both.
- sigil 13y ago> If the problem in OTR is we can't rely on users to verify who each other are... Not what I'm saying here. I think the specific way they've chosen to verify a new party in OTR -- by agreeing on a shared secret through some other channel -- is a bad user experience with security implications. Normal people will choose dumb, guessable secrets. Or send them over insecure channels. I think the equivalent of an in-person PGP key signing has a better chance of succeeding. If we're talking about an app, one person's phone could display a QR code of their pubkey, and the other could scan that in to import it. As with PGP, once the web of trust has a backbone (composed of hardcore early adopters like us here on HN), you can skip the in-person step, and trust keys that enough of your contacts trust. OTR doesn't have this network effect. > The only solution to it is external trusted parties. Sure. But who those external trusted parties are is the crux of the issue. Is it a browser maker and a couple companies you don't get to choose? Who are perhaps cooperating with some government (hey, it's happened)? Or is it people you actually choose and choose to trust? > On top of that, PGP is exactly a step backwards if you're worried about just observation of metadata because PGP with web-of-trust cryptographically ties every message you send forever back to the key which sent it. I mentioned this in the grandparent: with PGP, you could also derive ephemeral keys for the conversation, as OTR does. > You have to choose which problem you find more important: either you can be very anonymous, or very sure of who you're talking to but never both. Not so. You can both be anonymous from the man-in-the-middle's perspective, but can also verify each other. Look at how OTR does it. The "Socialist Millionaire's Protocol." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_millionaire http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_millionaire