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Oh wonderful, thanks for the reply! And thanks for the links (the "Politics, Programming, Data and the Drogulus" post had already been placed in my when-have-ti

by wfn 13y ago

Oh wonderful, thanks for the reply! And thanks for the links (the "Politics, Programming, Data and the Drogulus" post had already been placed in my when-have-time-random-reading-list, cool.) I'll be sure to follow up with comments if I have any later on. I assume that the crypto identity part of the system is indeed motivated by Sybil-like attack vector towards similar P2P systems, or something of the sorts. (Warning: convoluted phrasing follows --) Logos programs and anonymity: I assume your system is not primarily designed to provide some level of anonymity (in the sense of message-originator decoupling). Some P2P systems try and implement a characteristic by which it is impossible to say whether a particular message seen in the network is originating from node X, or was simply broadcast by some node(s), one of which is X. Of course, if we have node identities and message signing, this is obvious, but - the idea could be to decouple actual pub-private-key identities from the nodes themselves (or perhaps implement an 'anonymous messaging' identity system atop the other, so there'd be identities for nodes, and for persons/people/virtual-identities, the two sets obviously overlapping but not homomorphic to each other (a node could broadcast/introduce a myriad of secondary identities, etc.) Thing is, if Logos could be used to organically extend the system to implement such functionality, it would be rather impressive indeed. (By 'could' I do not suggest anyone doing it, merely observing my thought that the very possibility would be a curious fact about drogulus.) /end of coffee-related rant, gtg, thanks for the reply again!

ntoll 13y ago
Yes, the crypto identity aspect goes some way to address Sybil like problems. Regarding anonymity: you're only as anonymous as your association with your public key[s]. Given that items (k/v pairs) stored in the DHT are self-contained in terms of proving provenance it doesn't matter from what node they originate. Put plainly, there is no need for a node id (a SHA512) to be linked to a specific user (identified by their public key). I explain how signing items works here: http://ntoll.org/article/drogulus-questions-and-clarifications http://ntoll.org/article/drogulus-questions-and-clarificatio... For me, the most curious fact about the drogulus is that it is a ubiquitous ecosystem for asynchronously processing Logos code and data. If you see the implication of this then you'll get where I'm trying to go with the drogulus. :-)

by wfn 13y ago

ntoll 13y ago

Yes, the crypto identity aspect goes some way to address Sybil like problems. Regarding anonymity: you're only as anonymous as your association with your public key[s]. Given that items (k/v pairs) stored in the DHT are self-contained in terms of proving provenance it doesn't matter from what node they originate. Put plainly, there is no need for a node id (a SHA512) to be linked to a specific user (identified by their public key). I explain how signing items works here: http://ntoll.org/article/drogulus-questions-and-clarifications http://ntoll.org/article/drogulus-questions-and-clarificatio... For me, the most curious fact about the drogulus is that it is a ubiquitous ecosystem for asynchronously processing Logos code and data. If you see the implication of this then you'll get where I'm trying to go with the drogulus. :-)