3 ms·
> There's a reason people use a single PRNG I just want to know what it is. (Edit as can't reply to child: Sure, but this gets back to the mathematical analys
by contingencies 13y ago
> There's a reason people use a single PRNG
I just want to know what it is.
(Edit as can't reply to child: Sure, but this gets back to the mathematical analysis does not equal real world proof, since we do not know all possible computational (or side channel!) vectors. Assertion otherwise is reminiscent of Socrates: οὖτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴμαι This man, on one hand, believes that he knows something, while not knowing [anything]. On the other hand, I – equally ignorant – do not believe [that I know anything]. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing ... OK that's weak, but honestly that's how I tend to think (ie. with great cynicism about any assertion) and it serves me alright in general security / non-cryptographic discourse. Basically this approach is treating the PRNG algorithm as a black box, refusing to trust it, and attempting to design a system incorporating the black box along with others claiming the same functionality, based upon that assumption. If this works for any other algorithm - and it seems to - then why not PRNGs? It's not like cryptography has a monopoly as an arbiter of risk. Cryptography is not a silver bullet.)
- StavrosK 13y agoIt's in the next sentence: > and the reason is that, when your PRNG's output is provably indistinguishable from true randomness, messing with it will certainly not improve it, and will probably ruin it.